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“Incest” is symbolic of the special way in which the pattern of social relation-
ships, as they are normatively defined, can be broken . . . .  “Incest” means the 
wrong way to act in a relationship . . .  To act not merely wrong, but to act in a 
manner opposite to that which is proper.  It is to “desecrate” relationships.  It is 
to act “ungrammatically.” 
—David Schneider, The Meaning of Incest1 
 
Law is rife with slippery slope rhetoric.  When pressed to describe the 
potential harm that could flow from any given law, courts and lawyers, like 
politicians on the stump, turn to the rallying cry of the slippery slope.  In-
voking a downward spiral of inevitable and dire consequences, they inveigh 
against the immediate threat by emphasizing—and amplifying—the threats 
sure to follow.  Nowhere is this mode of rhetoric more prevalent, or more 
forceful, than in politically charged issues like same-sex marriage, abortion, 
and gun control, each of which represents a playing field for debates over 
foundational social concerns and core constitutional values such as the fam-
ily, the rights to life and to choose, and the right to defend oneself.   
One of the more infamous slippery slope arguments in recent memory 
appeared in April of 2003, when United States Senator Rick Santorum in-
voked the metaphor of the slope in order to presage the world of sexual 
abandon that the decriminalization of sodomy ostensibly would provoke:  
“If the Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual [gay] sex 
within your home, then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to 
polygamy, you have the right to incest, you have the right to adultery.  You 
have the right to anything.”2  While publicly condemned for his glib remark, 
Santorum was merely giving voice to the chain of implied catastrophe that 
the Supreme Court majority in Bowers v. Hardwick3 envisaged in 1986, that 
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Lawrence v. Texas,4 would portend later in 
2003, and that the public has been lamenting for quite some time now—
namely, that acceptance of same-sex relations will lead to the erosion of 
sexual taboos like polygamy, bestiality, and incest. Responding to Santo-
rum’s reference to incest specifically, one journalist opined that “Santorum 
has a point in asserting that such a ruling could put us on a slippery slope 
 
1  David Schneider, The Meaning of Incest, 85 J. POLYNESIAN SOC’Y 149, 166 (1976).  
2  Interview by the Associated Press with Sen. Rick Santorum (Apr. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Santorum 
Interview].    
3  478 U.S. 186, 195–96 (1986) (White, J.) (“[I]f respondent’s submission is limited to the voluntary 
sexual conduct between consenting adults, it would be difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right 
to homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes 
even though they are committed in the home.  We are unwilling to start down that road.”).  
4  539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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toward legalizing some forms of incest, the most repellent of the practices 
he listed.”5   
What is it, though, about incest that renders it a key player in slippery 
slope rhetoric?  It would be easy to dismiss analogies between same-sex re-
lations and incest as the fatuous cant of social conservatives and mere rhe-
torical puffery—and dismissal, it turns out, is often the response.  For 
instance, The New Republic’s Andrew Sullivan has attacked the comparison 
as absurd:   
If you want to argue that a lifetime of loving, faithful commitment between 
two women is equivalent to incest or child abuse, then please argue it.  It 
would make for fascinating reading.  But spare us this bizarre point that no 
new line can be drawn in access to marriage—or else everything is up for 
grabs . . . .6   
Similarly, Peter Beinart, also of The New Republic, summarily dismissed 
the analogy by stating simply that “there’s a very good reason for the state 
to get in and get involved with incest because it produces deformed chil-
dren.”7 
To dismiss or overlook the same-sex relations/incest comparison, how-
ever, is to underestimate the sheer breadth and depth of the incest taboo in 
contemporary discourse about sexuality and the family—as well as the sim-
ple fact that, for some, same-sex relations are like incest.  To the extent that 
incest has been invoked by those who wish to foreground—and magnify—
 
5  Stuart Taylor Jr., Santorum on Sex   Where the Slippery Slope Leads, THE ATLANTIC ONLINE, 
May 6, 2003 (“Santorum’s remarks are more plausible as legal analysis . . . than most critics have ac-
knowledged. . . . Might Lord Byron’s problem [(consensual sex between an adult brother and sister)] 
nonetheless be outlawed because it has long been despised as repugnant and immoral?  Not if there is an 
unqualified constitutional right to consensual adult sex.  And sodomy, no less than sibling incest, has for 
centuries been subject to ‘condemnation . . . firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical stan-
dards,’ as the late Chief Justice Warren E. Burger stressed in a concurrence in Bowers v. Hardwick.  
Public opinion is moving toward majority support for a right to have gay sex.  But it’s not there yet.”), 
available at http://www.sodomylaws.org/santorum/sneditorials055.htm.  But see Austin Bramwell, Mu-
tilated Debate   Homosexuality Shouldn’t Be Compared to Incest, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Mar. 4, 2004 
(“[T]he incest gambit, while tactically shrewd, is strategically unsound.  For one thing, it reinforces the 
impression that conservatives only object to new rights for gays out of disgust for their conduct.  Mere 
feelings, however, no matter how strong, do not provide reasons for government policies.  Besides, if 
disgust for homosexual acts can be overcome (as, among today’s youth, it already has), so, presumably, 
can disgust for incestuous acts.”), at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/ 
bramwell200403040848.asp; Dahlia Lithwick, Slippery Slop   The Maddening Slippery Slope Argument 
Against Gay Marriage, SLATE, May 19, 2004 (“Since few opponents of homosexual unions are brave 
enough to admit that gay weddings just freak them out, they hide behind the claim that it’s an inexorable 
slide from legalizing gay marriage to having sex with penguins outside JC Penney’s.  The problem is it’s 
virtually impossible to debate against a slippery slope.  Before you know it you fall down, break your 
crown, and Rick Santorum comes tumbling after.”), at http://slate.msn.com/id/2100824.   
6  Andrew Sullivan, Dialogues   Gay Marriage, SLATE, Mar. 21, 1997, at http://slate.msn.com/id/ 
3642/entry/23844.   
7  Jonah Goldberg, Springfield vs. Shelbyville   Gay Marriage, Incest, and The Simpsons, NAT’L 
REV. ONLINE, July 1, 2003, at http://www.nationalreview.com/goldberg/goldberg070103.asp. 
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the dangers of same-sex marriage, we must understand both incest and how 
it figures in the rhetoric of the slippery slope.  Unlike the other taboos on 
the slippery slope of sexual deviance, incest has become a term that signi-
fies any deviation from the norm; consequently, the very term “incest” is a 
powerful way to provoke an almost visceral disgust toward any relationship 
to which it is compared.  In other words, incest describes not simply sexual 
relationships between family members, but also, and more comprehen-
sively, any relationship—be it social, sexual, or even reproductive—that is 
“opposite to that which is proper.”8  How else can we explain the strange 
conflation of incest and cloning that has appeared numerous times in the 
writings and recommendations of Leon Kass, head of President Bush’s Bio-
ethics Council?9  The degree to which the incest taboo has been used to in-
spire disgust against a range of consensual relationships—its sheer 
overinclusiveness—is perhaps the best reason why we should not dismiss 
the incest/same-sex marriage comparison so lightly.  Quite the contrary, the 
appearance of incest on the slippery slope as a disgust-provoking mecha-
nism demands rigorous critique.  As Martha Nussbaum has recently con-
tended, disgust—or what Kass has famously called “the wisdom of 
repugnance”10—is simply an unacceptable ground for legal regulation.11   
In this Article, I look at the extent to which the incest taboo has shaped 
law, politics, and public perception in two related legal domains—namely, 
in the law surrounding sexuality and in family law.  Specifically, I examine 
the way in which incest has been used to define a normative vision of sexu-
ality and the family, and to trigger disgust toward otherwise consensual in-
timate relationships, most notably same-sex relations.  While incest is not 
the only taboo on the slippery slope of sexual deviance, it is the one taboo 
that represents in the collective imagination, including the legal imagina-
tion, an archetypal form of boundary violation and a potent symbol of dis-
gust.  It is for this reason that legal actors, policymakers, and others have 
turned to incest as an object of comparison to a range of relationships that 
provoke disgust in ways that recall the mythic horror of the incest taboo.  
Understanding precisely why incest is an object of disgust is indispensable 
to understanding how incest and same-sex relations, or incest and cloning, 
could possibly be linked in the legal imagination.   
After Lawrence, a number of legal scholars asked whether the law 
would turn its attention to incest as the next taboo on the slippery slope.12  
Here, I consider the key predicate questions that the literature overlooks.  
 
8  Schneider, supra note 1, at 166.  
9  See infra note 219 and accompanying text.  
10  Leon R. Kass, Religious, Philosophical, and Ethical Perspectives on Cloning   The Wisdom of 
Repugnance   Why We Should Ban the Cloning of Humans, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 679 (1998). 
11  See infra note 102 and accompanying text.  
12  See, e.g., Brett McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 337, 337 (2004); Cass 
Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?   Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. 
CT. REV. 27, 48. 
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What is incest doing at the bottom of the slope in the first place?  How 
might we explain its power to drive slippery slope rhetoric over such varied 
issues as interracial marriage, same-sex marriage, and alternative reproduc-
tive technologies?  In the Parts that follow, I take issue with the argument, 
advanced by some legal commentators, that discussion about the taboo has 
led to its erosion and that “incest taboos appear less serious than a genera-
tion ago because procreation is no longer always a primary concern of mar-
riage.”13  While states have lifted certain incest prohibitions, and while 
courts have been analyzing the legitimacy of incest laws for quite some 
time, the incest taboo remains a potent symbol of non-normative sexual-
ity—that is, it continues to represent a “serious” threat to the ideal family 
unit, one that is comprised of heterosexual parents who have children 
through a “natural” mode of reproduction.  In addition, despite the multi-
plicity of meanings that attach to incest among the states, it has recently 
emerged as a single and monolithic force—incest or the incest taboo—in 
debates over the constitution of the family and its mode of reproduction.   
As a normative matter, I am more interested here in examining and cri-
tiquing the way in which the incest taboo has defined the outer limits of 
kinship than in assessing whether laws against incest either will, or should, 
be repealed.14  While I agree with the statement that “the proffered explana-
tions for incest prohibitions should be deeply problematic for any same-sex 
marriage advocate,”15 among others, I do not aim in this piece to provide a 
systematic framework for overturning incest laws—particularly those laws 
 
13  Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts   Crisis, Change, and Continuity in American Family Law, 
1890–1990, 28 IND. L. REV. 273, 292 (1995) (quoting WALTER O. WEYRAUCH & SANFORD N. KATZ, 
AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION 352 (1983)); see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Reason, Tradition, 
and Family Law   A Comment on Social Constructionism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1526 (1993) (stating 
that “the continuing vulnerability of family law [including incest prohibitions] to the Enlightenment cri-
tique has fueled a movement in recent years that has demanded considerable deregulation of family life 
in the name of individual rights”); Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment 
“Privacy” Law   An Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social Issues, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
79, 98 (1988) (“Rational analysis of taboos is not only likely to miss this point, but even itself to weaken 
the taboo.  Once you begin to think about which kinds of incest-like activities lack particular identifiable 
harmful consequences for particular identifiable participants, you begin to think about the unthinkable 
and about why some ‘incest’ is harmless incest.  As this process continues, the emotional force of the 
taboo, its force as a general deterrent, is eroded.”).  
14  For arguments that either propose that certain incest laws be repealed or analyze the possibility of 
this taking place after Lawrence, see Carolyn S. Bratt, Incest Statutes and the Fundamental Right of 
Marriage   Is Oedipus Free to Marry?, 18 FAM. L.Q. 257, 298–309 (1984); Martha M. Mahoney, A Le-
gal Definition of the Stepfamily   The Example of Incest Regulation, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 21 (1993); 
McDonnell supra note 12, at 337 (examining “how the decision in Lawrence affects laws regulating 
other forms of sexual behavior, choosing in particular consensual adult incest as a way to give the argu-
ment focus”); Christine McNiece Metteer, Some “Incest” Is Harmless Incest   Determining the Funda-
mental Right to Marry of Adults Related by Affinity Without Resorting to State Incest Statutes, 10 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 262 (2000). 
15  Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 709, 762 
(2002). 
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that cannot be justified on harm-based grounds alone.  Rather, my objec-
tives are to question the privileged position that the incest taboo has main-
tained in the law governing sexuality and the family more generally, and to 
propose that the law reappraise the extent to which disgust, rather than rea-
soned argument, sustains laws directed at sexual and familial choice.  In so 
doing, I hope to contribute to the larger, and more recent, conversation 
among legal scholars over the proper place of revulsion in the law.16   
Part I will examine the structural features of the slippery slope, one of 
the primary means by which taboos in general, and the incest taboo in 
particular, have been transmitted in an effort to influence public opinion and 
to shape legal norms.  After providing a theoretical analysis of slippery 
slopes, I turn to the role that incest has played in slippery slope rhetoric and 
examine a recent case17 in which Lawrence and its so-called companion 
case, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,18 figured in the feared 
movement down the slippery slope to incest.19   
Part II will draw from Part I’s analysis of slippery slopes in order to 
examine more closely the key position that incest has occupied at, or near, 
the bottom of the slippery slope of sexual deviance.  I shall argue that incest 
is a bad fit for slippery slope arguments.  When we say that we are slipping 
down the slope to polygamy, or adultery, or bestiality, it is fairly clear what 
we mean and where we are going because those taboos have a relatively 
definite meaning.  But when we say that we are slipping down the slope to 
incest, it is much less clear where we are headed because the meaning of in-
cest is much less stable and has shifted over time.  Although incest appears 
in legal and nonlegal slippery slope arguments as a single and monolithic 
taboo, incest, in fact, is marked by definitional variety (from state to state, 
including who can commit, and what constitutes, incest) and halting pro-
gress toward legalization.  In other words, it is unlikely that same-sex mar-
riage will cause us to slide down the slope because in some ways we have 
already slipped.   
Parts III and IV will move from the slippery slope to a closer examina-
tion of the typical justifications for the incest taboo in order to show that 
they fail to provide a full explanation for why incest provokes such disgust.  
These Parts will provide the theoretical framework that I will use to explain 
not only why incest has remained a powerful and monolithic taboo on the 
slippery slope, but also why it has been compared to other sexual (and re-
productive) taboos pertaining to the constitution of the family.  Part III will 
contend that the genetic harm and child sexual abuse justifications for the 
 
16  See infra note 102 and accompanying text.  
17  Commonwealth v. Rahim, 805 N.E.2d 13, 23 (Mass. 2004). 
18  798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).  
19  I refer to Lawrence and Goodridge as “companion cases” in the sense that critics have ap-
proached them in similar terms with respect to their perceived roles in activating the “slippery slope to 
incest.”  
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incest taboo fail both to capture the full range of disgust that incest repre-
sents and to explain why incest remains a potent symbol of non-normative 
sexuality.  Specifically, I maintain that incest revulsion is triggered in harm-
ful and nonharmful situations alike; as such, it represents an exception to 
the classic understanding of harm, advanced by John Stuart Mill, as that 
alone which justifies legal regulation.20  Part IV will then provide the criti-
cal framework that I will use to situate this theory of the incest taboo as a 
form of boundary maintenance as well as the more general theory of disgust 
as boundary violation.  This Part will look closely at the analogies that have 
been made between incest and other taboos, old and new, in order to help 
bring into focus the theory of boundary violation that I offer.   
In Part V, I will draw from the theoretical claims made in the previous 
Parts in order to explore more fully how, and why, incest has been strategi-
cally used to articulate an ideal vision of the family—a vision grounded in a 
particular understanding of nature and the natural family unit.  Here, I shall 
contend that the incest taboo has continued to shape a normative under-
standing of the family with respect to who can get married and how they 
can reproduce, despite the claim that “rational analysis” of the incest taboo 
has “weaken[ed] the taboo.”21  In addition, I shall return to the logic of dis-
gust in order to illuminate the symbiotic relationship that exists between the 
law and the incest taboo.   
The incest taboo has figured—and continues to figure—crucially in 
slippery slope arguments over sexuality and the constitution of the family.  
And yet, given the definitional variety of incest in American law, and given 
the fact that one court has already struck down an incest statute on state 
constitutional grounds,22 incest is a bad fit for the slippery slope model.  
Further, harm justifications for the incest taboo are suspect.  The question 
then arises why, despite these weaknesses, the incest taboo and its role in 
the slippery slope metaphor should figure so heavily in contemporary ar-
guments about acceptable and unacceptable familial arrangements—and, 
most important for this Article, about same-sex relations.  I shall argue that 
the emotion of disgust is the only way to comprehend the depth and breadth 
of the incest taboo and its persistent place of “honor” at the bottom of the 
slippery slope.  But should disgust, which is largely socially contingent, 
 
20  See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (Hackett Publ’g Co. 1978) (1859).  As Mill explains in the introduc-
tory remarks to his celebrated text: 
The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the 
dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means 
used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion.  That 
principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in in-
terfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection.  That the only purpose 
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against 
his will, is to prevent harm to others.   
Id. at 9.    
21  Schneider, supra note 13, at 98. 
22  Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762 (Colo. 1978). 
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carry the freight of such a powerful metaphorical symbol?  In other words, 
should we be so confident in our “tastes” (disgust) that we permit them to 
dictate proscribed and prescribed forms for the expression of the basic hu-
man need for intimacy?  Or should the law reappraise the breadth of the in-
cest prohibition and the extent to which incest-revulsion substitutes for 
rational evaluation of same-sex marriage and other “deviant” relationships? 
I. INCEST AND THE SLIPPERY SLOPE 
In order to appreciate the persistence of the incest taboo over time, it is 
necessary first to understand the role that the taboo has played in arguments 
pertaining to the legal regulation of sexuality.  Section A will provide a 
general overview of the structure and function of slippery slopes.  Section B 
will then look specifically at the position that incest has maintained, both 
historically and currently, at the bottom of the slippery slope of sexual devi-
ance.  This section will also look at a recent state court case that has re-
ceived a good deal of attention by slippery slope enthusiasts.23  I shall 
contend, however, that the slippery slope arguments that have surfaced in 
response to this case are unpersuasive and, in fact, shed light on inherent 
weaknesses of the “slippery slope to incest” formulation.   
A. Structural Features of the Slippery Slope 
What do slippery slopes tell us about sexual taboos like incest?  Or, 
more appropriately, how might we define the precise relationship that exists 
between sexual taboo and the slippery slope in the legal, social, and politi-
cal domains?  Sexual taboos and slippery slopes often go hand in hand in 
both legal reasoning and political debate.  In fact, we might even say that 
one of the primary functions of the sexual taboo is to define the parameters 
of the slippery slope (or at least a certain kind of slippery slope), for the 
more taboo the prohibition, the steeper, and hence more slippery, the slope.  
Sexual taboos and slippery slopes, or rather sexual taboos on slippery 
slopes, have been key players in the culture wars over the extent to which 
the state may control the intimate realms of family and sexuality—to say 
nothing of the highly contested issue of whether the state has any business 
interfering in the latter of those two realms at all.   
As a constitutive feature of the slippery slope, sexual taboos have been 
effective in scripting the controversy over same-sex marriage, providing the 
language that we now use, in nearly unconscious fashion, to frame this legal 
and political issue.24  Prior to Lawrence,25 sexual taboos and slippery slopes 
were routinely deployed in an attempt to influence public opinion with re-
spect to whether consensual sexual behavior should be subject to criminal 
 
23  See infra notes 62–70 and accompanying text. 
24  See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980). 
25  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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penalties.  Even after Lawrence, one suspects that legal actors and policy-
makers will continue to rely on sexual taboos and slippery slopes in order to 
regulate non-normative families—such as those between same-sex part-
ners—with respect to a wide range of family law issues, including marriage, 
adoption proceedings, and custody determinations.26 
The classic formulation of the slippery slope resembles the following:  
While A, the case under consideration or the “instant case,” is innocuous 
enough, B, the danger case, must be avoided at all costs—even if that 
means forfeiting A.  As Frederick Schauer explains, “[a] slippery slope ar-
gument claims that permitting the instant case—a case that it concedes to be 
facially innocuous and that it linguistically distinguishes from the danger 
case—will nevertheless lead to, or increase the likelihood of, the danger 
case.”27  While Schauer insists that A, the instant case, is unobjectionable 
and perhaps even desirable,28 other commentators, including Eugene Vo-
lokh and Eric Lode, have qualified Schauer’s structural prototype by ob-
serving that the inoffensive nature of A is not a necessary predicate for a 
slippery slope argument:  “Sometimes appeals to SSAs [slippery slope ar-
guments] are . . . attempts to help us see what their proponents believe is the 
objectionable nature of A.  While SSAs may implicitly concede that A is 
unobjectionable considered alone, such arguments need not make this con-
cession.”29   
Critics have isolated two species of slippery slope arguments:  (1) ra-
tional-grounds and (2) empirically-based.  Rational-grounds slippery slope 
arguments assume that a distinction cannot be made between A, the object 
under consideration, and B, the object of comparison.  This kind of argu-
 
26  Whether or not Lawrence enjoins courts from considering sexual orientation as one factor among 
many in adoption proceedings and custody disputes remains unclear.  See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t 
of Children and Fam. Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We conclude that it is a strained and 
ultimately incorrect reading of Lawrence to interpret it to announce a new fundamental right.  Accord-
ingly, we need not resolve the second prong of appellants’ fundamental-rights argument:  whether ex-
clusion from the statutory privilege of adoption because of appellants’ sexual conduct creates an 
impermissible burden on the exercise of their asserted right to private sexual intimacy.”), reh’g en banc 
denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). 
27  Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 369 (1985).   
28  Id. at 368.  
29  Eric Lode, Slippery Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1469, 1481 (1999).  
Lode defines slippery slope arguments generally as “arguments that urge us to resist some practice or 
policy, either on the grounds that allowing it could lead us to allow some other practice or policy that is 
clearly objectionable, or on the grounds that we can draw no rationally defensible line between the two.”  
Id. at 1476.  Lode thus makes a distinction between rational SSAs and empirical SSAs, observing that 
“[e]mpirical SSAs maintain that we should not allow A on the grounds that allowing it would increase 
the likelihood of our allowing each successive case on the slope, until we finally reach some objection-
able result.”  Id at 1504; see also Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1026, 1030 n.12 (2003) (“Slippery slope arguments are sometimes made by people who dislike 
both A and B:  the arguer may say ‘Even if A is good on its own, it might lead to a bad B,’ while really 
thinking that A is bad itself.  But the argument is framed this way only because the arguer thinks some 
listeners may like A but oppose B.”). 
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ment “rel[ies] on the idea that there is no non-arbitrary stopping place any-
where along the slope.  Typically, such arguments maintain that there are no 
important differences between A and m, between m and n . . . and the 
clearly objectionable B.”30  Take the following argument as an example:  
Because marijuana and cocaine are in essence the same—each a mind-
altering substance—the law cannot, within the bounds of logic, permit the 
use of one drug and prohibit the other.  Insofar as “we can draw no non-
arbitrary line along the slope, rational-grounds SSAs maintain that we 
should not step on it in the first place.”31   
By contrast, empirical slippery slope arguments assume that while dif-
ferences between A and B exist, A should nevertheless be prohibited “on the 
grounds that allowing it would increase the likelihood of our allowing each 
successive case on the slope, until we finally reach some objectionable re-
sult.”32  Take now the slightly modified version of the first drug argument:  
While marijuana and cocaine might reflect different orders of magnitude on 
the mind-altering substance scale, the legalization of marijuana might lead 
to the legalization of cocaine; for this reason, the law should allow neither.  
Whereas rational-grounds SSAs thus posit that there is no principled dis-
tinction between A and B—e.g., marijuana and cocaine, or, more relevant 
here, same-sex marriage and incest—empirical SSAs are slightly more dis-
criminating, recognizing the difference between A and B but nonetheless 
wary that one could easily slip from A to B by making a series of conces-
sions along the way down the slope.  
Whether we characterize slippery slopes as rational-grounds or empiri-
cally-based, however, the fear is largely the same—namely, that A will ei-
ther collapse or slip into B, which sits near, or at, the bottom of the slope 
and threatens to pull A down through sheer gravitational force.  While ra-
tional-grounds slippery slope arguments might posit that no principled dis-
tinction exists between A and B, they nevertheless still employ the metaphor 
of the slope—one that reflects a moral hierarchy whereby B, or whatever 
rests at the bottom, is worse than A.  Because B must be avoided at all costs, 
the slippery slope argument is deployed in order to maintain the status quo, 
or what Schauer calls the “state of rest.”33  In other words, the metaphor of 
the slippery slope assumes that the desired state of affairs exists somewhere 
on the plateau at the top of the slope—the plateau signifying a state of rest, 
or the status quo.  Any force—our A here—that threatens to push us over 
the edge and into the abyss, where B resides, is strictly prohibited.  Put less 
abstractly, for at least some individuals same-sex marriage (or same-sex re-
 
30  Lode, supra note 29, at 1484.   
31  Lode, like Schauer before him, describes this as a version of Sorites paradox, according to which 
“taking a grain of sand away from a heap of sand makes no significant difference:  What we are left with 
will still be a heap of sand.”  Id. at 1485; see also Schauer, supra note 27, at 372. 
32  Lode, supra note 29, at 1504. 
33  Schauer, supra note 27, at 371. 
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lations) (“A”) and incest (“B”) might very well be equally contemptible and 
share common characteristics.  Nevertheless, there is still no getting around 
the fact that incest, our “B” here, sits at the bottom of the slope and thus in 
some sense enjoys the privilege of being the worst of a bad lot.  It is for 
precisely this reason that same-sex marriage (or same-sex relations), insofar 
as it edges us off the plateau and closer to incest, constitutes an object of 
grave concern.34 
While the claim that A will cause or result in B might be “illogical,”35 
and while slippery slope arguments are not always “logically compelled,”36 
they are nevertheless highly persuasive because they appear to “describe a 
behavioral reality”—that is, they seem to reflect the way people think.  
Moreover, slippery slopes can be potent rhetorical tools, and, according to 
Volokh, “present a real risk—not always, but often enough that we cannot 
lightly ignore the possibility of such slippage.”37  As Volokh has recently 
demonstrated, the “mechanisms” of slippage are wide-ranging, and include 
the driving role of precedent in American law, the vagaries of the democ-
ratic process, linguistic imprecision, and the degree to which the considera-
tion (and eventual legalization) of A might cause an attitudinal shift—
leading legislators, jurists, and the public alike to find B less threatening 
and perhaps even inevitable.38  To this list one might add the gravitational 
force of the landmark case, that is, “cases we use to chart our course to fu-
ture decisions” and that “alter[] our jurisprudence by introducing some new 
value into it or by altering the significance we attach to some value already 
 
34  Lode, supra note 29, at 1528 (“Some SSAs can be viewed, at least in part, as expressions of dis-
approbation toward allowing A.  Allowing A will often represent the corruption of some value that is 
important to the proponent of the SSA.  This corruption will frequently be accentuated or magnified in 
the case of B.  B thus can put us in a better position to understand why the proponent of the SSA is trou-
bled by the thought of allowing A.  This, in turn, may enable us to do more justice to the deeper concerns 
that lie behind her invocation of the argument.”).  
35  Schauer, supra note 27, at 369 (“[The slippery slope claim] seems not to be an appeal to logic.  
Indeed, it is in some sense illogical.”). 
36  Id. at 370.   
37  Volokh, supra note 29, at 1038; see also Schauer, supra note 27, at 382 (“It is true that the phe-
nomenon of the slippery slope is not strictly logical and that a slippery slope effect is always in logical 
and linguistic theory eliminable.  But as long as law and life are inhabited by people with human weak-
nesses of bias and deficiencies of understanding, who govern with laws of limited complexity, the 
claims of slippery slope effect will not necessarily be invalid.”).   
38  Volokh, supra note 29, at 1036 (“Attitude-altering slippery slopes happen when the expressive 
power of law changes people’s political behavior as well as their other behavior, by leading them to ac-
cept proposals that they would have rejected before.”); see also Lode, supra note 29, at 1515 (“Other 
closely related factors can also lead to such slides.  First, going through some process may change our 
views of that process.  By allowing each successive case on a slope, judges’ views on the law may begin 
to change in ways that lead them to neglect their possible hesitancy to step on the slope in the first place.  
Second, allowing some practice could lead to a shift in our norms regarding when uses of that practice 
are appropriate.  Third, certain decisions may become landmarks—cases we use to chart our course to 
future decisions.”).  
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existent in our discourse.”39  Proponents of the slippery slope might argue 
that “[i]f a decision allowing A is likely to be viewed as a landmark, we 
may have good grounds for fearing that the judiciary will gradually allow 
practices further down the slope.”40  Some slippery slope enthusiasts have 
already conceptualized Lawrence and Goodridge in precisely this way:  that 
is, as two such landmark cases that could lead us down the slope toward 
several different B’s, including same-sex marriage and the decriminaliza-
tion of all sexual morality laws, such as laws prohibiting incest.41   
B. Incest and Slippery Slope Arguments 
Both prior to and following Lawrence and Goodridge, two species of 
incest slippery slope arguments were current:  first, the movement from 
sodomy to “incestuous” sex (the decriminalization of incest); and second, 
the movement from same-sex marriage to incestuous marriage (the civil 
recognition of incestuous relationships).42  To be sure, these same “parade 
of horribles” arguments predated Lawrence, and were in fact fairly com-
monplace in the mid-1990s.  For instance, testifying before Congress prior 
to the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”),43 Hadley Arkes, 
Professor of Jurisprudence and American Institutions at Amherst College, 
posed the following question:  If same-sex marriage were allowed, “[on 
w]hat ground would the law say no” to incest?44   
It is important to note, however, that slippery slope arguments that 
raise the specter of incest are neither new nor particular to the debate over 
the legalization of sodomy and same-sex marriage.  Rather, incest has oc-
cupied a privileged position on the slippery slope of sexual deviance for 
quite some time now, as the taboo against incest was once used to support 
 
39  Lode, supra note 29, at 1519. 
40  Id. 
41  See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the “landmark” status of Law-
rence, see Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas   The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its 
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1895 (2004) (“[T]he best we can do now is take the measure of Law-
rence as a landmark in its own right by placing its logic in the context of the larger project of elaborat-
ing, organizing, and bringing to maturity the Constitution’s elusive but unquestionably central 
protections of liberty, equality, and—underlying both—respect for human dignity.”).  
42  It should be noted that the division that I have made between criminal incest (sexual relations) 
and the civil prohibition against incestuous marriage is not entirely apt in light of the fact that, in several 
states, criminal incest is defined as either marriage or sexual relations.  Such is not the case with respect 
to the criminal/civil distinction between sodomy and same-sex marriage, which are clearly different.  If 
anything, the fact that in some states incestuous sex is no different from incestuous marriage insofar as 
either would constitute the crime of incest, highlights the ambiguity of the very term “incest” as it has 
been deployed in legal and political debate.  
43  Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2005) and 1 U.S.C. § 7 
(2005).  
44  Defense of Marriage Act   Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 87 (1996) (statement of Prof. Hadley Arkes), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/25728.pdf.  
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the taboo against miscegenation in arguments that bear a striking resem-
blance to the arguments that have more recently surfaced.  Incest therefore 
has a history of surfacing in slippery slope arguments at times when law 
and culture are confronted with threatening forms of sexuality and non-
normative family arrangements.   
For instance, in 1872, the Tennessee Supreme Court considered 
whether the state could prosecute an interracial couple for violating Tennes-
see’s antimiscegenation law.  In that case, State v. Bell,45 the plaintiffs, a 
white man and an African-American woman, were married in Mississippi, 
which, unlike Tennessee at that time, permitted interracial marriage.  Al-
though recognizing that such unions were permitted in the state of Missis-
sippi, the Bell court nevertheless upheld the couple’s conviction for 
miscegenation in the state of Tennessee by adverting to three related forms 
of boundary control:  state sovereignty, antimiscegenation laws, and the in-
cest taboo.   
The court first noted that because  
[e]ach State is a sovereign, a government within, of, and for itself . . . [it] can-
not be subjected to the recognition of a fact or act contravening its public pol-
icy . . . as lawful, because it was made . . . in a State having no prohibition 
against it or even permitting it.46 
The court’s use of the public policy rationale implicitly rested on the trope 
of boundary maintenance; indeed, the phrase “within, of, and for itself” rep-
resented the linguistic correlative of the geographical, social, and political 
boundaries that separated the states and ensured their individual sover-
eignty.47  Racial miscegenation here found its counterpart in geographical 
miscegenation couched in the language of conflict of laws—each an equally 
dangerous and infective form of boundary violation.  Put slightly differ-
ently, the physical body (the actual “mixing” of the races) figured as a 
metaphor for the body politic (protection of state borders), and vice versa.48  
 
45  66 Tenn. 9 (1872).  
46  Id. at 11. 
47  The Bell court was not alone in situating the issue of interracial marriage within the larger context 
of state sovereignty.  For instance, in 1878, the Supreme Court of Virginia remarked that laws against 
interracial marriage would be  
futile and a dead letter if in fraud of these salutary enactments, both races might, by stepping 
across an imaginary line, bid defiance to the law, by immediately returning and insisting that the 
marriage celebrated in another state or country, should be recognized as lawful, though denounced 
by the public law of the domicile as unlawful and absolutely void. 
Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. 858, 859 (1878).  Similarly, in 1890, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
underscored the need to maintain boundaries “between” borders and “between” the races:  “It will thus 
be seen how clearly recognized and distinctly fixed is the purpose of the state of Georgia to prohibit 
within its borders, miscegenation, as the result of marriages between the white and black races.”  State v. 
Tutty, 41 F. 753, 757 (C.C.S D. Ga. 1890). 
48  In this sense, one might recall the passage of DOMA and its “mini” state equivalents (including 
the various state amendments banning same-sex marriage) as similar efforts to delineate boundaries and 
assert state sovereignty over the definition of marriage.  
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To be sure, it was for precisely this reason that a federal antimiscegenation 
amendment to the United States Constitution was proposed in 1911—an 
uncanny forebear to the federal marriage amendment that was proposed 
(unsuccessfully) in 2004—and which led United States Representative 
Seaborn Roddenberry, an avid supporter of the antimiscegenation amend-
ment, to fulminate that  
[i]ntermarriage between whites and blacks is repulsive and averse to every 
sentiment of pure American spirit.  It is abhorrent and repugnant . . . .  It is 
subversive of social peace.  It is destructive of moral supremacy, and ulti-
mately this slavery of white women to black beasts will bring this nation to a 
fatal conflict.49 
Moreover, the Bell court deployed the proverbial slippery slope argu-
ment involving the ineluctable descent to incest:   
[By e]xtending the rule to the width asked for by the defendant, . . . we might 
have in Tennessee the father living with his daughter, the son with the mother, 
the brother with the sister, in lawful wedlock, because they had formed such 
relations in a State or country where they were not prohibited.50   
Thus, in addition to considering the threat of racial mixing and to fram-
ing the issue as one of state sovereignty, the court presaged yet a third form 
of boundary violation, namely, intrafamilial sexuality.  While I shall return 
to this idea of incest as an exemplary form of boundary violation in Part 
IV—one that helps to bring into focus the routine comparison between in-
cest and miscegenation—suffice it to note here that incest once occupied a 
position at the bottom of the slippery slope with respect to miscegenation 
that resembles the position that it currently occupies with respect to same-
sex relations.   
Similarly, slightly more than ten years after Bell, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri considered whether to sustain a demurrer to an indictment charg-
ing a white woman with violating a statute that made interracial marriage a 
felony.  The plaintiff in that case, State v. Jackson,51 contended that Mis-
souri’s antimiscegenation statute violated the state and federal constitutions.  
In rejecting the plaintiff’s claim and reversing the lower court’s judgment 
sustaining the demurrer, the court compared laws against miscegenation to 
laws against incest, stating that “the State has the same right to regulate 
marriage in this respect that it has to forbid the intermarriage of cousins and 
other blood relations.”52  As with the Bell court, the Jackson court deployed 
a variant of the slippery slope argument in portending the deplorable conse-
quences that would follow should the court find that the federal Constitu-
tion guaranteed an unqualified right to marry: 
 
49  49 CONG. REC. 503 (1912) (statement of Rep. Roddenberry).   
50  Bell, 66 Tenn. at 9. 
51  State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 176 (1883). 
52  Id.  
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All of one’s rights as a citizen of the United States will be found guaranteed by 
the Constitution of the United States.  If any provision of that instrument con-
fers upon a citizen the right to marry any one who is willing to wed him, our 
attention has not been called to it.  If such be one of the rights attached to 
American citizenship all our marriage acts forbidding intermarriage between 
persons within certain degrees of consanguinity are void, and the nephew may 
marry his aunt, the niece her uncle, and the son his mother or grand-
mother. . . . The condition of a community, moral, mental and physical, which 
would tolerate indiscriminate intermarriage for several generations, would 
demonstrate the wisdom of laws which regulate marriage and forbid the inter-
marriage of those nearly related in blood.53  
As in Bell, incest functioned in Jackson as the danger case toward 
which society might slip should the relationship in question—interracial 
marriage—receive legal recognition.  In both cases from the post-war pe-
riod, the courts relied on a kind of rhetorical proliferation—“the nephew 
may marry his aunt, the niece her uncle, and the son his mother or grand-
mother”—as a means of conveying the negative concatenating effect of de-
criminalizing tabooed sexual behavior. 
The parade of horribles that would result should states recognize inter-
racial marriage resonates with the recent declarations sounded by critics of 
same-sex relations.  Specifically, like the Bell court, critics of sodomy and 
same-sex marriage have relied on a similar strategy of rhetorical prolifera-
tion:  “If the Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual (gay) 
sex within your home, then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right 
to polygamy, you have the right to incest, you have the right to adultery.  
You have the right to anything.”54  In addition to the more formal pro-
nouncements of Justice Scalia and Senator Santorum, a number of commen-
tators have taken up the perceived relationship between incest and same-sex 
relations in light of Lawrence and Goodridge.  As mentioned, one commen-
tator has noted that “Santorum has a point in asserting that such a ruling 
could put us on a slippery slope toward legalizing some forms of incest, the 
most repellent of the practices he listed.”55 
More recently, Stanley Kurtz, a research fellow at Stanford’s Hoover 
Center and critic for The National Review, has argued that same-sex mar-
riage will lead not only to the dissolution of marriage as an institution, but 
also to incest.  Kurtz contends that the “[t]he taboo against homosexuality 
works in a similar fashion” as the taboo against incest; consequently, the 
erosion of one taboo might lead to the erosion of another, such that “[g]ay 
marriage would set in motion a series of threats . . . from which the institu-
tion of marriage may never recover.”56  Because the mythic specter of incest 
 
53  Id.  
54  Santorum Interview, supra note 2.  
55  See supra note 5.   
56  Stanley Kurtz, The Libertarian Question   Incest, Homosexuality, and Adultery, NAT’L REV. 
ONLINE, Apr. 30, 2003, at http://www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz043003.asp. 
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exists near the bottom, and helps to define the gradient, of the slippery 
slope, any slippage that might occur through the legalization of same-sex 
marriage must be prevented before it begins.57   
The correlation between incest and same-sex relations is by no means a 
mere rhetorical flourish, although a perennial favorite of conservative 
commentators.  Rather, some less biased commentators maintain that the 
slippery slope arguments that have been made with respect to incest and 
same-sex relations might not be entirely far-fetched.  For instance, Slate 
magazine’s chief political correspondent, William Saletan, has suggested 
that Santorum’s claim, as interpreted by David Smith, Communications Di-
rector for the Human Rights Campaign, that “being gay [is] on the same le-
gal and moral plane as a person who commits incest”58 is not so wildly 
implausible: 
In its brief to the Supreme Court in the sodomy case, [the Human Rights Cam-
paign] maintains that “criminalizing the conduct that defines the class serves 
no legitimate state purpose,” since gays “are not less productive—or more 
dangerous—members of the community by mere dint of their sexual orienta-
tion.”  They sustain “committed relationships” and “serve their country in the 
military and in the government.”  Fair enough.  But couldn’t the same be said 
of sibling couples?  Don’t laugh.  Cousin couples are already making this ar-
gument.59   
While Saletan “[t]hink[s] Santorum is wrong” because a moral differ-
ence exists between incest and same-sex relations, he concludes by ceding 
that “legally, I don’t see why a sexual right to privacy, if it exists, shouldn’t 
cover consensual incest.”60  In the same vein, Volokh has suggested that, 
contrary to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’s assertion other-
wise, it is “eminently plausible” that “the Massachusetts homosexual mar-
riage decision may lead to legalization of adult incestuous marriages.” 61   
 
57  See generally Michelle MacAfee, Catholic Bishops   Same-Sex Marriage Could Lead to Incest; 
“You Open the Door to Things You Can’t Foresee,” BROCKVILLE RECORDER & TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003, 
at A5 (quoting Jean-Claude Cardinal Turncotte, Archbishop of Montreal, who in the wake of Lawrence 
stated that “‘[w]hen you change the definition of the institution, you open the door to things you can’t 
foresee.’ . . . ‘If marriage is a union between two persons who love each other—that’s the new defini-
tion, without the allusion to sex—where does the notion stop?  Will you recognize the marriage between 
a father and his daughter?  Between a brother and his sister?  Or two brothers or two sisters? . . . It’s 
very dangerous because we don’t know the consequences.’”); Louis Sheldon, Utah Man Uses Sodomy 
Decision to Push for Polygamy, TRADITIONAL VALUES COALITION (May 1, 2004) (stating that the 
“flawed logic” of Lawrence “could easily be extended to ‘consensual’ incest, prostitution, bestiality, and 
group sex orgies in the ‘privacy’ of a person’s home”), at http://www.traditionalvalues.org/ 
modules.php?sid=1309.  
58  William Saletan, Incest Repellant?   If Gay Sex Is Private, Why Isn’t Incest?, SLATE, Apr. 23, 
2003, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2081904.  
59  Id.; see also William Saletan, Incest Repellant Continued   More on Santorum, Sodomy, and In-
cest, SLATE, Apr. 25, 2003, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2082075.  
60  Saletan, supra note 58. 
61  Eugene Volokh, Polygamous and Incestuous Marriages, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 18, 
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Some individuals would agree with Professor Volokh.  For example, 
consider the reaction of some critics after the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts decided Commonwealth v. Rahim just four months after it 
decided Goodridge.62  In Rahim, the court considered whether a Massachu-
setts incest statute applied to purely affinal63 relationships.  The defendant 
was charged with rape, abuse of a minor, and incest in connection with the 
sexual abuse of his sixteen-year-old stepdaughter.64  Because the defendant 
was not related to his stepdaughter by either blood or adoption, he moved to 
dismiss the incest charge, arguing that “the necessary element of consan-
guinity under the incest statute was absent.”65  The Rahim court agreed with 
the defendant on the ground that the plain language of the statute did not in-
clude affinal relationships within its definition of incest, and that there was 
no evidence to suggest that the legislature intended to include such relation-
ships.66  
Following a lengthy interpretation of the statute and of the etymology 
of “consanguineous,” the court held that the incest statute applied only to 
blood relations.67  While recognizing the abusive character of the relation-
ship in question, the court nevertheless expressed concern that criminalizing 
affinity-based relationships would unduly infringe on consensual adult sex-
ual conduct:  “The interpretation that the Commonwealth urges on us 
sweeps up and criminalizes not only the repugnant conduct alleged in this 
case, but a wide assortment of relationships between consenting adults.”68  
In addition, the court emphasized the fact that the state had already success-
fully charged the defendant under a number of other criminal statutes—in 
other words, regardless of how the court ruled on the incest charge, the de-
fendant still would have faced additional criminal penalties.69  The court fi-
                                                                                                                           
2003), at http://volokh.com/2003_11_16_volokh_archive.html.  According to Volokh,  
[t]he [Goodridge] court reasons that ‘the right to marry means little if it does not include the right 
to marry the person of one’s choice,’ but while it qualifies this as ‘subject to appropriate govern-
ment restrictions in the interests of public health, safety, and welfare,’ it’s far from clear that a 
court would find that ‘health, safety, and welfare’ would be hurt by adult polygamous marriages 
(assuming all existing partners in the marriage consent to the addition of another).  Likewise for 
adult brother-sister marriages; as I mentioned several months ago, I think the genetic harm argu-
ment doesn’t really work here—after all, we don’t generally ban marriages between people who 
have serious genetic diseases, even if the odds of a defect in their children are much higher than 
for brother-sister marriages.   
Id. (quoting Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 958 (Mass. 2003). 
62  805 N.E.2d 13 (Mass. 2004).   
63  By “purely affinal,” I mean, here and throughout, a relationship based exclusively on marriage 
(e.g., step-relatives related by neither the whole nor the half blood).   
64  Rahim, 805 N.E.2d at 14.  
65  Id. 
66  Id. at 23. 
67  Id. 
68  Id.  
69  Id.    
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nally concluded by remarking that “[w]e leave it to the Legislature to ex-
pand the incest prohibition if it so chooses.”70 
Some have speculated that the Rahim decision and its focus on consent 
were motivated, in part, by the same court’s decision in Goodridge four 
months earlier and by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence.  For in-
stance, after Rahim was decided, a student writing on Harvard Law 
School’s Federalist Society’s weblog, Ex Parte, opined that “[e]very week, 
it becomes clearer—Lawrence and Goodridge do undermine the criminali-
zation of incest.”71  Similarly, in an article that was circulated widely over 
the Internet, entitled Massachusetts Burning:  “Gay Marriage” Leads to 
Incest, the writer declared that  
making no sense and running roughshod over the voters and families of Mas-
sachusetts is what this same 4-3 majority has begun to get really good at.   
 I said earlier this year—when this same majority ordered by executive fiat 
that the acceptance of sexual unions of the same-sex (homosexual) “marriage” 
be mandated and recognized by law—that rulings like [Rahim] were on their 
way.  I just never believed that they would come so quickly.72  
The problem with this statement—as with so much information on the 
woefully unedited Internet—is that it got the facts wrong:  With the excep-
tion of one justice, the four to three majority in Rahim was not the same 
four to three majority in Goodridge.  In fact, the justice who authored a dis-
senting opinion in Goodridge, Justice Cordy, was the same justice who au-
thored the majority opinion in Rahim, thus casting doubt on the slippery 
slope contention that the majority in Rahim was somehow compelled to 
recognize “consensual adult relations” between stepfathers and stepdaugh-
ters because that same majority had extended the civil right of marriage to 
same-sex couples in Goodridge.  
More important, though, is the fact that the Rahim court was simply 
following an approach that it had followed in prior cases when dealing with 
similar matters of statutory interpretation.  For instance, in an earlier case, 
Commonwealth v. Smith,73 the same court considered whether digital pene-
tration and oral sex fell within the scope of the state incest statute, which 
defined the act of incest as marriage, sexual intercourse, or both.  There, the 
court held that “in light of . . . legislative activity, we are compelled to limit 
the meaning of ‘sexual intercourse’ in G.L. c. 272, § 17, to penile-vaginal 
penetration, with or without emission, and to conclude that the incest in-
 
70  Id. 
71  Posting of Eric Soskin to Ex Parte, at http://fedsoc.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_ 
fedsoc_archive.html (Mar. 23, 2004, 13:36 EST).  
72  Kevin McCullough, Massachusetts Burning   “Gay Marriage” Leads to Incest, 
WORLDNETDAILY (Mar. 23, 2004), at http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID= 
37764.   
73  Commonwealth v. Smith, 728 N.E.2d 272 (Mass. 2000).  
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dictments against the defendant were properly dismissed.”74  As a result of 
the court’s holding in Smith, the Massachusetts legislature amended the in-
cest statute to include “unnatural sexual intercourse” in the list of prohibited 
activities.75  In light of Smith, it would appear that, rather than sliding down 
a slippery slope that Goodridge and Lawrence put into motion, the Rahim 
court simply felt that its hands were tied—as it surely believed, and openly 
conveyed, in Smith—because the legislature had chosen to define incest in a 
rather narrow way.   
Whether Rahim in fact reflects a movement down the slippery slope is, 
therefore, largely speculative.  That said, Rahim is useful because it sug-
gests at least two reasons why the privileged position that the incest taboo 
has enjoyed on the slippery slope warrants closer attention.   
First, Rahim reveals the extent to which a uniform definition of incest 
does not exist.  The legal heuristic of the slippery slope as something on 
which we slip from A to B assumes that there is something definite (or de-
finable) into which we might slip.  However, Rahim shows that what might 
be incestuous conduct in one state—e.g., sexual relations between a stepfa-
ther and stepdaughter—might be permissible, nonincestuous conduct in an-
other.   
Second, Rahim, which relies on a wealth of prior case law dealing with 
the legitimacy and interpretation of state incest statutes, reveals that a legal 
conversation about incest had been taking place for quite some time before 
Goodridge and Lawrence.  That is, the slippery slope argument assumes 
that B (incest) is necessarily posterior to A (same-sex marriage) and that B 
needs A in order to occur—or, less drastic, that A is a vehicle through which 
B might appear as an object of consideration on the public’s radar screen.  
To be sure, the metaphor of the slope is rhetorically effective precisely be-
cause it evokes a visual hierarchy between and among terms on it (B is 
made possible only through A) and because it conveys a sense of imminent 
slippage to a place at the bottom—a nadir—that we have never deigned to 
imagine.  However, Rahim shows that talk about incest has a long history 
and did not suddenly materialize after the recent decisions dealing with 
same-sex relations. 
The following Part will look more closely at these problems that 
plague the “slippery slope to incest” formulation in order to set the stage for 
exploring more fully why the incest taboo has retained its power over time.  
In Parts III and IV, I shall argue that incest has maintained its privileged po-
sition at the bottom of the slippery slope not because the “slippery slope to 
incest” argument is logically persuasive, but rather because of the enormous 
power of incest to elicit disgust. 
 
74  Id. at 275–76. 
75  See Act of July 3, 1974, 1974 Mass. Acts 474 (current version at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 23 
(2005)). 
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II. PROBLEMS WITH THE “SLIPPERY SLOPE TO INCEST” FORMULATION 
A. No Single Definition of Incest Exists 
Statutory definitions vary significantly among the states over what 
constitutes incest.  It is, of course, a basic principle of federalism that the 
regulation of certain social relations—including what constitutes incest and 
who may (and may not) marry—lies within the province of state control; 
for this reason, definitional variety is not intrinsically remarkable.  How-
ever, the variation in the legal definition of incest among the states reveals a 
lack of clarity over where it is that we are slipping to when we “slip” down 
the proverbial slope to incest.  In this sense, incest, unlike polygamy or bes-
tiality, is neither a stable nor a fixed taboo in slippery slope rhetoric.   
For instance, whereas several states criminalize sexual relations be-
tween parents and children related by affinity, Massachusetts, Rahim tells 
us, does not.76  In fact, the criminal codes of twenty other states, following 
the Model Penal Code,77 do not define as “incest” sexual relations between 
family members related by affinity; some of those same states, however, do 
prohibit marriage between affinally-related adults.78  Dissenting in Rahim, 
Justice Greaney highlighted this paradox when he observed that “the court 
leaves us with a situation where this defendant will avoid prosecution for 
incest, and (unless the statute is changed) a stepfather can have consensual 
sexual intercourse with his sixteen year old stepdaughter without fear of 
criminal sanction.  (But, he will not be able to marry her).”79  Other states 
punish affinal incest only if the victim is a child (variously defined) or if the 
 
76  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 17 (2005).  
77  For this discussion, see Commonwealth v. Rahim, 805 N.E.2d 13, 25–26 (Mass. 2004).  The 
Model Penal Code has rejected affinity-based incest as a basis for criminal sanctions.  See MODEL 
PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 230.2 cmts. 2(c)–(e), at 405–07 (1980). 
78  For instance, while in Massachusetts there is no criminal prohibition for sexual relations between 
individuals related by affinity, those same individuals are prohibited from getting married under the 
state’s domestic relations statute.  See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 17.  For those states that do not 
criminalize sexual relations between parents and children related only by affinity, see ALASKA STAT. 
§ 11.41.450 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3608 (West 2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 25-101 (West 2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 285 (West 1999); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2200 (West 2004); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 826.04 (West 2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (Michie 2003); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 707-741 (Michie 2003); IDAHO CODE § 18-6602 (Michie 2004); IDAHO CODE § 32-205 
(Michie 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-3 (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3602 to 21-3603 
(1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:78 (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 556 (West 1983); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.365 (West 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 122.020 (Michie 2004); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 201.180 (Michie 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-10-3 (Michie 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 255.25 (McKinney 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-11 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-03 
(2004); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4302 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-4 (1956), repealed by 
1989 R.I. Pub. Laws 214, § 1; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 205 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1–3 
(2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-366 (Michie 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-38.1 (Michie 2004); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 765.03 (West 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.06 (West 2004). 
79  Rahim, 805 N.E.2d at 26.  
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sexual contact was nonconsensual.  For example, Montana’s incest law 
provides that “[c]onsent is a defense . . . to incest with or upon a stepson or 
stepdaughter, but consent is ineffective if the victim is less than 18 years 
old.”80   
The states also vary in their application of incest statutes to first cous-
ins, adopted children, in-laws, and even uncles and nieces.  For instance, 
eighteen states and the District of Columbia permit first-cousin marriage, 
whereas twenty-five do not.81  The remaining seven states permit such mar-
riages only if certain criteria are met.  In Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Utah, 
and Wisconsin, first-cousin marriage is permitted on the condition that the 
couple will not bear children either because the woman is postmenopausal 
or because the couple is infertile.82  In Maine, first-cousin marriage is per-
mitted on the condition that the couple receives genetic counseling prior to 
marriage.83  And in North Carolina, first-cousin marriage is permitted on the 
condition that the marriage is not between double first cousins (i.e., those 
that share all lineal and collateral relatives).84  With respect to criminal pro-
hibitions, only eight states continue to criminalize sexual relations between 
first cousins.  As Brett McDonnell has observed, “[a]t the time the Model 
Penal Code was drafted, eighteen states prohibited sex between first cous-
ins, and that number has now dropped to eight.  Thus, incest between first 
cousins today is forbidden by fewer states than forbade sodomy before 
Lawrence.”85   
 
80  MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-507 (2003). 
81  For jurisdictions that prohibit first-cousin marriage, see, for example, ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-
106(a) (Michie 2002) (marriages between first cousins are incestuous and absolutely void); IDAHO CODE 
§ 32-206 (Michie 1996) (marriages between first cousins prohibited); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.19 (West 
2001) (marriage between first cousins void); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-102 (1995) (marriage between first 
cousins incestuous and absolutely void); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.010 (Michie 1999) (marriages be-
tween first cousins are incestuous and void); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401(b) (2003) (marriage be-
tween first cousins void); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-03(5) (2004) (marriage between first cousins void); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 106.020 (2003) (marriage between first cousins void); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-6 
(Michie 1999) (marriage between first cousins null and void).  For jurisdictions that permit first-cousin 
marriage, see, for example, CAL. FAM. CODE § 2200 (West 2004) (not listed in prohibited degrees); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 19-3-3(a) (2003) (first cousins not listed in prohibited degrees); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 572-1 (Michie 1999) (first cousins not listed in prohibited relations). 
82  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3608 (West 2001); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-11(2) (West 
2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-3 (West 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.03 (West 2001); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 30-1-1 (2001).  
83  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(2)(B) (West 1998).  
84  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (2003).  A rarity, double first cousins are the children of two brothers 
who reproduce with two sisters.  Suppose A and B, brothers from one family, marry C and D, respec-
tively, sisters from a separate family.  A and C have children, and B and D have children.  Those chil-
dren are double first cousins because they share both sets of grandparents (i.e., the children of A and C 
have the same grandparents as the children of B and D).   
85  McDonnell, supra note 12, at 350; see also MARTIN OTTENHEIMER, FORBIDDEN RELATIVES:  
THE AMERICAN MYTH OF COUSIN MARRIAGE (1996) (noting the definitional variety in first cousin in-
cest prohibitions in the United States and arguing that the U.S. prohibition against such unions origi-
nated largely out of the belief that it would promote more rapid assimilation of immigrants).  
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In addition, whereas twenty states include adoptive relatives (adoptive 
parent and adopted child; adoptive siblings and adoptive child) within their 
criminal incest prohibitions, thirty states and the District of Columbia do 
not.  Similarly, whereas forty-four states and the District of Columbia 
criminalize incest between uncles or aunts and nephews or nieces, six do 
not.86  That said, with the exception of Rhode Island, no state permits uncles 
to marry nieces and aunts to marry nephews.  Rhode Island, which repealed 
its criminal incest law in 1989, has retained a civil incest law that exempts 
any individuals who are related either by blood or through marriage from 
the marriage prohibition, provided that they are Jewish and are governed by 
religious precept.87 
Finally, some states, like Rhode Island, do not even criminally define 
sexual relations between close blood-related individuals as incestuous.  For 
instance, South Dakota’s criminal code defines incest as  
[a]ny person, fourteen years of age or older, who knowingly engages in sexual 
contact with another person, other than that person’s spouse, if the other per-
son is under the age of twenty-one and is within the degree of consanguinity or 
affinity within which marriages are by the laws of this state declared void.88   
Similarly, Michigan and New Jersey’s laws prohibit incest involving per-
sons under eighteen, but not if both individuals are above that age.89  The 
irony here, however, is that South Dakota also has a civil prohibition 
against marriage between any individuals within a certain degree of blood 
relatedness, regardless of age.90  In other words, while certain blood rela-
tives cannot get married in South Dakota, they may engage in sexual rela-
tions—as long as they are over the age of twenty-one.  Indeed, these are just 
a few examples of the vast diversity of the law surrounding this taboo that 
is routinely grouped under the collective, umbrella term “incest.”   
In addition to a lack of uniformity over the class of individuals to 
which state incest statutes apply, a lack of consensus also characterizes the 
precise behavior that constitutes incest.  For instance, whereas some crimi-
nal statutes define the prohibited activity more broadly as “sexual contact” 
or “sexual conduct,” others have rather narrow definitions of the crime that 
 
86  The six states that do not are Illinois, Kentucky, Montana, Ohio, Washington, and Wyoming.  See 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-11 (West 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.020 (Michie 1999); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-507 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (West 1997); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9A.64.020 (West 2000); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-402 (Michie 2003). 
87  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-4 (2003) (“Marriages of kindred allowed by Jewish religion.—The 
provisions of §§ 15-1-1 to 15-1-3 shall not extend to, or in any way affect, any marriage which shall be 
solemnized among the Jewish people, within the degrees of affinity or consanguinity allowed by their 
religion.”).  Similarly, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which has not been adopted by every 
state, would permit uncle-niece and aunt-nephew marriage if the couple is from an “aboriginal” culture.  
UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 207(a)(3) cmt. (1973). 
88  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-19.1 (Michie 1998).  
89  See McDonnell, supra note 12, at 361 tbl.1.  
90  See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-6 (Michie 1999).   
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limit it to sexual (penile-vaginal) intercourse, marriage (Wisconsin, Utah), 
or both.91  Still others grade the crime of incest into degrees based on the 
kind of behavior in question, with sexual intercourse constituting first de-
gree incest and sexual conduct constituting second degree incest (Washing-
ton).92   
Whereas the other taboos that occupy a place on the slippery slope are 
subject to a more standardized definition among the states, the law of incest 
does not enjoy such uniformity.  One might object that a standard definition 
of incest does exist insofar as all states criminalize sexual relations between, 
say, father and daughter or brother and sister related by the whole or half 
blood.  However, as discussed above, even this definition does not obtain in 
some states, like South Dakota, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, which do 
not define sexual relations between any blood-related individuals of a cer-
tain age as incestuous.  I contend that such definitional variety renders the 
argument that we might slip down the slope to incest—whether it be inces-
tuous sex or incestuous marriage—less persuasive.   
If, for instance, the “slippery slope to incest” argument has been used 
to presage the sexualization of the family that will follow from cases like 
Lawrence and Goodridge, that argument becomes less convincing in light 
of the fact that many states do not characterize sexual relations between 
stepparents and stepchildren, adoptive parents and their adopted children, 
and even certain blood-related parents and their children as incest.  In other 
words, some states had already determined that it was acceptable for sexual 
relations to occur between certain family members before these two land-
mark cases were decided.  In addition, if, as many believe, legalized incest 
would be tantamount to legalizing intrafamilial sexual abuse, then the nar-
row criminal definition of incest that currently obtains in many states (e.g., 
penile-vaginal sexual intercourse) suggests that such abuse is already le-
gal—or at least not treated by the law as incestuous per se.  Finally, if slip-
pery slope believers have adverted to incest in order to warn others of the 
Darwinian nightmare that would result should incest bans be lifted, their ar-
gument becomes less convincing in light of the fact that many states do not 
prohibit either sexual relations or marriage between first cousins—where a 
genetic risk, while not great, is nonetheless present—as well as that in some 
states (South Dakota, Rhode Island, and New Jersey) close relatives may 
reproduce without facing criminal penalties.93  I will return to the weak-
 
91  UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-7-102 (2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.06 (West 2004). 
92  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.64.020 (West 2000). 
93  And, to recall, Rhode Island does not prohibit any individuals related by blood, marriage, or 
adoption from getting married if they are Jewish.  For the debate surrounding whether first cousins run 
the risk (or perhaps the benefit) of having children with certain recessive traits should they decide to re-
produce, see Robin L. Bennett et al., Genetic Counseling and Screening of Consanguineous Couples and 
Their Offspring   Recommendations of the National Society of Genetic Counselors, 11 J. GENETIC 
COUNSELING 97, 106 (2002) (estimating that the additional risk of deleterious genetic conditions falls in 
the range from 4.7 to 6.8% for first cousin unions, as opposed to 3 to 4% for the general population); 
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nesses of the genetic (or biological) argument in greater detail in Part III.  
For now, however, it is sufficient to note that the genetic argument alone 
fails to capture the particular threat that incest represents.  
B. The Metaphor of the “Slope” Does Not Hold up 
Slippery slope arguments presume that the boundary separating the 
“extant state of affairs” or “the state of rest” from the “danger case” (i.e., 
the boundary separating the flat ground at the top of the slope from the dan-
ger that lurks at the bottom) is firmer than “the one between the instant case 
and the danger case” (i.e., the boundary separating that which has moved, or 
might move, us off the flat ground and closer to the dangerous nadir).94  For 
this reason, anything that brings us closer to the danger case, including the 
instant case, is, or at least should be, strictly prohibited.  Applying this for-
mulation to the same-sex-marriage-to-incest slippery slope, or to the same-
sex-consensual-sex-to-incest slippery slope, the likelihood of legalizing in-
cest based on the existing state of affairs—where we are now—is much less 
than the likelihood of legalizing incest should bans against same-sex mar-
riage be lifted.   
Incest laws, however, were subject to constitutional attack well before 
Lawrence and Goodridge.  Indeed, even a brief survey of the state reporters 
reveals that legal arguments and constitutional claims pertaining to the dan-
ger case at the bottom of the slope—incest—have a lineage that pre-dates 
the recent cases dealing with same-sex relations.95  In other words, the 
                                                                                                                           
Bratt, supra note 14, at 267–76; McDonnell, supra note 12, at 352–53.  
94  Schauer, supra note 27, at 378. 
95  For instance, in State v. Benson, the defendant, a father charged with incest and sexual abuse of 
his biological child, claimed that the incest statute violated his “fundamental right to private consensual 
acts of sexual intercourse, regardless of the degree of affinity between the parties.”  612 N.E.2d 337, 339 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1992).  The court disagreed.  Finding that the right to engage in an incestuous relation-
ship was not “deeply-rooted” in the nation’s history, the court subjected the incest statute to rational ba-
sis review, concluding that “[w]e need hardly cite authority for the obvious conclusion that this statute 
bears a real and substantial relation to the public morals.”  Id.  Similarly, in State v. Allen M. (In re Tif-
fany Nicole M.), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of a parental termina-
tion statute against both a due process and an equal protection challenge.  571 N.W.2d 872, 876–78 
(Wisc. Ct. App. 1997).  The defendants in that case, biological siblings involved in a seemingly consen-
sual relationship, had parented three children; the state was attempting to terminate their parental rights 
as to one of the children on the ground that their incestuous relationship rendered them per se unfit.  
Recognizing that “a parental rights proceeding interferes with a fundamental right,” the court neverthe-
less found that the state had “compelling interests in the welfare of children, preservation of family, and 
maintenance of an ordered society.”  Id. at 876.  The court further reasoned that “[g]enetic muta-
tion . . . is but one consequence of incest, and only one of many reasons why Wisconsin and other states 
have long prohibited incestuous marriage and criminalized incest.”  Id. at 878.  Although the court cited 
authority for the proposition that “[w]hether consanguineous mating causes genetic defects may be more 
questionable than generally assumed,” it nevertheless did not find the biological argument to be disposi-
tive.  Id. at 875 n.8.  For other unsuccessful constitutional challenges to state incest statutes, see Benton 
v. State, 461 S.E.2d 202 (Ga. 1995) (holding that the prohibition against incest was rationally related to 
the legitimate state interest of protecting children and the family unit); In the Interest of L., 888 S.W.2d 
337, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a father’s undisputed acts of incest with his minor sisters 
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boundary separating the “extant state of affairs” from the danger case is 
much less definite than the slippery slope enthusiasts would have us be-
lieve.  Whereas no court in the United States has recognized a legal chal-
lenge to laws prohibiting polygamy or bestiality, at least one court—the 
Colorado Supreme Court in Israel v. Allen96—has already recognized an 
equal protection challenge, on state constitutional grounds, to an incest stat-
ute. 
The plaintiffs in that case challenged a provision of a Colorado incest 
statute that prohibited marriage between a brother and a sister related solely 
by adoption on the ground that it violated their fundamental right to marry.97  
While the district court agreed with the plaintiffs that the statute was not 
supported by a compelling state interest, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
went further, stating that, regardless of whether marriage was a fundamental 
right, the statute failed to satisfy even rational basis review.98  The court re-
lied heavily on the biological argument, reasoning that it was illogical to 
prohibit an adopted brother and sister from marrying because there was no 
genetic threat: 
[O]bjections that exist against consanguineous marriages are not present where 
the relationship is merely by affinity.  The physical detriment to the offspring 
of persons related by blood is totally absent.  The natural repugnance of people 
toward marriages of blood relatives, that has resulted in well-nigh universal 
moral condemnation of such marriages, is generally lacking in applications to 
the union of those only related by affinity.99  
I shall return to the Israel court’s striking analysis of the relationship be-
tween nature and adoption through its deployment of the nature trope in 
Part IV.  More important for present purposes, however, is the fact that, as 
early as 1978, a court found that there was no rational basis on which to 
support the incest prohibition as applied to individuals related by adoption, 
presumably opening the door to any number of subsequent legal challenges.  
The metaphor of the slippery slope derives much of its power by what 
it visually depicts and by what that depiction assumes—namely, the exis-
tence of something at the bottom to which we should give heed and the fact 
that we are not there yet.  In the case of incest, however, neither of these as-
sumptions is entirely accurate.  Because the meaning of incest varies from 
state to state, it is uncertain just what is lurking at the bottom of the slope—
                                                                                                                           
involved children “in the family” within the meaning of statutory ground for termination of father’s pa-
rental rights to his biological daughter); State v. Buck, 757 P.2d 861, 864 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (holding 
that incest statute did not violate federal constitutional right to privacy); State v. Kaiser, 663 P 2d 839, 
843 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that statute criminalizing incest did not violate equal protection). 
96  Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762, 764–65 (Colo. 1978). 
97  See id. at 763. 
98  The court maintained that whether marriage was a fundamental right in the state of Colorado was 
in dispute.  See id. at 764. 
99  Id. at 764 (quoting 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 183 (1931)).  
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if father-daughter incest, then that is already permitted in many states, pro-
vided that the father and daughter are not related by blood (and, in a few 
states, certain forms of incest are permitted even despite the existence of a 
blood relationship).100  Further, the fact that incest statutes have been chal-
lenged, sometimes successfully, on constitutional grounds, suggests that A 
(e.g., same-sex marriage) is not necessarily higher on the incline than B 
(e.g., incest)—thus casting doubt on the topography of the slippery slope it-
self. 
Despite the multiplicity of meanings surrounding incest and the fact 
that the “state of rest”—or the flat ground before case A—is not as staid as 
the slippery slope model presumes, the incest taboo remains a potent mono-
lithic force at the bottom of the slope.  In one sense, Carl Schneider’s ob-
servation that “[r]ational analysis of taboos is not only likely to miss the 
point, but even itself to weaken the taboo,”101 represents a plausible theory 
of the way in which prohibition relies on silence to sustain itself.  But in 
another sense, it is arguable whether “rational analysis” of the incest prohi-
bition—including a successful constitutional challenge to an incest statute 
in Israel—has in fact led to its decline.  Quite the contrary, incest continues 
to anchor the slippery slope, one that has been instrumental in shaping pub-
lic opinion as well as the law itself.   
How might we then account for the persistence and persuasive force of 
incest as the yawning abyss at the bottom of the slippery slope in legal and 
political debate over the regulation of intimate relationships?  I would argue 
that the only way that we can begin to understand the position that incest 
occupies on the slippery slope is to comprehend the logic of disgust that 
underlies the incest taboo.  Specifically, the slippery slope at least theoreti-
cally assumes that a line can be drawn somewhere on the slope—a toehold, 
so to speak—at the point where behavior causes harm.  As Parts III and IV 
will show in greater detail, however, disgust is an emotion that is triggered 
in response to even harmless situations.  An examination of disgust sug-
gests that even if we could draw a line between harmful and harmless incest 
on the slippery slope, it is largely irrelevant because individuals would find 
even harmless incest to be a source of disgust.   
Recognizing precisely why many forms of incest provoke disgust is 
critical to understanding the power of the taboo as well as why it has been 
routinely deployed against a range of relationships, from interracial to 
same-sex relations.  In the next Part, I pose the following questions in order 
to clarify the precise threat that incest represents:  Is incest disgusting be-
cause it is harmful?  Or does incest trigger revulsion even in the absence of 
harm?  Clarifying whether, why, and the extent to which laws prohibiting 
incest are motivated by disgust will help to provide the necessary frame-
 
100  See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
101  Schneider, supra note 13, at 96.  
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work for approaching the broader question of precisely why, and how, the 
incest taboo has been used to articulate a normative vision of the family. 
III. INCEST AND HARM 
In her recent work on disgust, Martha Nussbaum has suggested that, 
while harm might provide a “prima facie case for legal regulation,” revul-
sion, or disgust, alone is never enough.102  If that is correct, then it is impor-
tant to determine whether laws against incest derive from a proper 
understanding of harm and whether a “prima facie case for legal regulation” 
of incest can be made.  If so, then at the very least we might be able to jus-
tify those laws and mark a line beyond which certain kinds of incest are 
harmful and thus warrant regulation.  If, however, laws against incest, even 
otherwise harmless incest, derive mainly from revulsion, then it is difficult 
to determine exactly where that “line” should be drawn.  More important, if 
the taboo has come to symbolize the revulsion surrounding even harmless 
sexual behavior, then this would provide a firm basis for criticizing the ex-
tent to which the taboo has been used in slippery slope arguments against 
otherwise consensual (and harmless) sexual relationships. 
A. Harm-Based Rationales for Laws Against Incest 
The two most common arguments that incest is harmful, and thus de-
mands regulation, are that consanguineous reproduction increases the 
chance for genetic abnormalities and that intrafamilial sexual relations are 
abusive.103  Indeed, the mere mention of incest summons images of “back-
woods” children and the specter of child sexual abuse.  While it is for partly 
these reasons that incest provokes disgust, neither of these rationales pro-
vides a complete or comprehensive account of the taboo’s persistence as a 
symbol of sexual deviance. 
Courts have sometimes referred to one, or both, of these harm-based 
rationales for sustaining laws against incest.  For instance, in Israel v. Allen, 
discussed in Part II, the Colorado Supreme Court turned to biology (or ge-
netic harm) when stating that “‘objections that exist against consanguineous 
marriages are not present where the relationship is merely by affinity.  The 
physical detriment to the offspring of persons related by blood is totally ab-
sent.’”104  Similarly, in upholding a constitutional challenge to a state incest 
 
102  Martha Nussbaum, “Secret Sewers of Vice”   Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in THE PASSIONS OF 
LAW 45 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (“[W]here disgust is concerned . . . I would argue that we never 
have even a prima facie case for legal regulation.”); see also MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM 
HUMANITY:  DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 14 (2004) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM 
HUMANITY] (“I shall ultimately take a very strong line against disgust, arguing that it should never be 
the primary basis for rendering an act criminal, and should not play either an aggravating or a mitigating 
role in the criminal law where it currently does.”).  
103  See infra notes 104–110 and accompanying text. 
104  577 P.2d at 764 (quoting 1 VERNIER, supra note 99, at 183). 
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statute by a biologically-related brother and sister in In re Tiffany Nicole 
M., the Wisconsin Court of Appeals adverted to biology when recognizing 
that “genetic mutation” is one of the many consequences of incest.105  In ad-
dition, courts have also justified laws against incest on the ground that in-
cest is tantamount to child abuse.  For instance, in Kaiser v. State, the 
Washington Court of Appeals stated that “[p]revention of mutated birth is 
only one reason for these statutes.  The crime is also punished to promote 
and protect family harmony, [and] to protect children from the abuse of pa-
rental authority . . . .”106 
Each of these rationales fails to provide a complete explanation for 
why incest elicits such disgust.  Considering first the genetic rationale, it 
would be difficult to argue that the mere fact that a child is born with reces-
sive genetic traits is in itself offensive; any number of children from non-
incestuous unions are born with such traits and we would not say that they 
necessarily elicit disgust.  Rather, what could very well be deemed offen-
sive, and thus legally prohibited, is the fact that parents might put their fu-
ture progeny in harm’s way by increasing the risk that they will be born 
with such traits.  But even this harm does not entirely explain the revulsion 
triggered by incest specifically or why certain kinds of incest are illegal.  
For instance, even when there is a strong likelihood that each parent carries 
a recessive trait, as in the case of Tay-Sachs disease in the Ashkenazi Jew-
ish community, the law does not require parents to undergo genetic testing 
prior to having children to determine whether the child or children will be 
born with a genetic abnormality.  In addition, even if nonrelated parents 
knew that they each carried a recessive trait and nevertheless decided to 
have children, it is unlikely that we would label that decision as disgusting 
per se—while certainly risky and arguably even irresponsible, probably not 
disgusting.  Perhaps the Supreme Court of Georgia had these inconsisten-
cies in mind when it altogether discounted biology as a valid justification 
for the incest taboo.  In that case, Benton v. State,107 the Georgia court found 
that the state’s criminal incest law applied to stepfamilies and biological 
families alike, reasoning that 
the taboo is neither instinctual nor biological, and it has very little to do with 
actual blood ties.  This is evidenced by the fact that the taboo is often vio-
lated—people generally are incapable of violating their instincts—and because 
society condemned incest long before people knew of its genetic effects.108   
Considering now the child sexual abuse rationale, it is unclear whether 
the idea of child abuse elicits disgust in the same way as does incest.  As 
with related parents who place their progeny in harm’s way by increasing 
 
105  State v. Allen M. (In re Tiffany Nicole M.), 571 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1997). 
106  State v. Kaiser, 663 P.2d 839, 843 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983). 
107  461 S.E.2d 202 (Ga. 1995). 
108  Id. at 205 (Sears, J., concurring).  
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the risk of recessive chromosomal traits, it is plausible that we would find 
sexually abusive parents and parent-figures disgusting because they se-
verely harm their biological, adoptive, or stepchildren physically as well as 
psychologically.  At the same time, however, child abuse and incest repre-
sent different orders of magnitude on the revulsion scale, largely because 
incest represents much more than child abuse.  Indeed, even in the absence 
of abuse, it is likely that we would label the incestuous relationship disgust-
ing.  In addition, and on a more practical level, if the harm that incest stat-
utes are targeting is abuse, then such harm is already adequately captured 
by statutes dealing with child abuse.  For instance, the National Center on 
Child Abuse and Neglect defines the former as “[c]ontacts or interactions 
between a child and an adult when the child is being used for the sexual 
stimulation of that adult or another person.”109  By contrast, incest is simply 
defined as “sexual relations between persons so closely related that mar-
riage is legally forbidden.”110  
These harm-based rationales are an incomplete way of accounting for 
the disgust that incest provokes and for why certain incestuous relationships 
must be legally prohibited.  To be sure, the Israel court did draw a line be-
tween harmful and nonharmful incest on the basis of genetics and biol-
ogy—at the point where offspring might suffer “physical detriment.”111  At 
the same time, however, the court suggested that our disgust responses are 
invariably triggered by any sexual relationship between blood-related rela-
tives, remarking that “‘[t]he natural repugnance of people toward marriages 
of blood relatives, that has resulted in well-nigh universal moral condemna-
tion of such marriages, is generally lacking in applications to the union of 
those only related by affinity.’”112  In other words, the Israel court assumed 
that all blood relatives—presumably including cousins—have an innate 
aversion for incestuous relationships, even biologically harmless incestuous 
relationships that might not necessarily involve sexual reproduction.  
Through this one sweeping statement, the court neglected to consider the 
fact that many blood relatives have entered into incestuous relationships in 
spite of this “natural” repugnance.  Similarly, although the petitioners’ three 
children in In re Tiffany Nicole M. were healthy and seemingly free from 
chromosomal defects, and although the court there noted that “[w]hether 
consanguineous mating causes genetic defects may be more questionable 
than generally assumed,” it nevertheless evinced disgust over the mere pos-
sibility of incest when it observed that “the incestuous parent by his actions 
has demonstrated that the natural, moral constraint of blood relationship has 
 
109  Joelle Anne Moreno, Comment, Killing Daddy   Developing a Self-Defense Strategy for the 
Abused Child, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1302 n.150 (1989) (quoting R. KEMPE & C. KEMPE, THE COM-
MON SECRET:  SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 10 (1984)). 
110  Id. 
111  Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762, 764 (Colo. 1978).  
112  Id. (quoting 1 VERNIER, supra note 99, at 183). 
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failed to prevent deviant conduct and thus cannot be relied upon to con-
strain similar conduct in the future.”113  In other words, like the Israel court, 
the In re Tiffany Nicole M. court suggested that something—a disgust 
mechanism, perhaps—exists in the “blood relationship” to prevent even 
presumably harmless incest encounters.  The courts’ rhetoric in these two 
opinions speaks to a much larger belief, shared by many, that incest is a 
source of disgust or repugnance even when it does not result in harm, ge-
netic or otherwise.   
B. Incest and the Insignificance of Harm 
Aside from the Georgia Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Benton v. 
State suggesting that harm-based rationales do not fully capture the threat 
that incest represents,114 does more empirically-based evidence exist that 
suggests that harm is irrelevant in the context of sexual taboos in general 
and the incest taboo in particular?  Research conducted over the last decade 
in the fields of cognitive science and moral psychology suggests that this is 
likely the case—that is, that notions of harm matter less in these particular 
contexts than we might have otherwise assumed.115  Scientists in these fields 
have increasingly contended that “for affectively charged events such as in-
cest and other taboo violations, a [social] intuitionist model may be more 
plausible than a rationalist model.”116  In so doing, they have challenged the 
 
113  State v. Allen M. (In re Tiffany Nicole M.), 571 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1997) (quot-
ing In re L., 888 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)). 
114  See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
115  See, e.g., Jonathan Haidt et al., Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?, 
65 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 613, 625 (1993) (stating that “[h]arm may be an important fac-
tor in the moral judgment of all cultures, but harm references may sometimes be red herrings”).    
116  Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail   A Social Intuitionist Approach to 
Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001) [hereinafter Haidt, The Emotional Dog]; see also 
Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?, 6 TRENDS IN 
COGNITIVE SCI. 517 (2002).  While alternative theories of morality—including the social interactionist 
and the social intuitionist perspectives—have gained acceptance, “[r]ationalism still rules, and there ap-
pears to be a consensus that morality lives within the individual mind as a traitlike cognitive attainment, 
a set of knowledge structures about moral standards that children create for themselves in the course of 
their everyday reasoning.”  Haidt, The Emotional Dog, supra, at 816.  For additional work on the sub-
ject, see S. BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS:  A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASON (1998); SHAUN 
NICHOLS, SENTIMENTAL RULES:  ON THE NATURAL FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL JUDGMENT (2004); Rich-
ard A. Schweder & Jonathan Haidt, The Future of Moral Psychology   Truth, Intuition, and the Pluralist 
Way, 4 PSYCHOL. SCI. 360 (1993).  It appears that the treatment of the social intuitionist model, as well 
as the affective basis for moral judgment, have begun to percolate into legal scholarship as well.  See, 
e.g., Jeremy Blumenthal, Who Decides?  Privileging Public Sentiment About Justice and the Substantive 
Law, 72 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2003); Neal R. Feigenson, Emotions, Risk Perceptions, and Blaming in 9/11 
Cases, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 959 (2004); Cass Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. 
L. REV. 1556, 1563 (2004) (“A great deal of recent attention has been paid to the fact that people often 
have a rapid, largely affective response to objects and situations, including job applicants, consumer 
products, animals, cars, and causes of action.”). 
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widely-held assumption that moral judgment is shaped by one’s perceptions 
of harm.   
The social intuitionist model claims that “moral judgment is caused by 
intuitive moral impulses and is followed (when needed) by slow, ex post 
facto moral reasoning.”117  According to this model, moral judgments, like 
aesthetic judgments, are made quickly and intuitively—particularly in re-
sponse to scenarios, such as incest, that elicit disgust or extreme emotion.118  
The “intuitionist” aspect of the model presumes that morality is driven by 
intuitions, which are defined as “the sudden appearance in consciousness of 
a moral judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), 
without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of search-
ing, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion.”119  The “social” aspect of 
the model presumes that moral reasoning “is usually an ex post facto proc-
ess used to influence the intuitions (and hence judgments) of other people.  
In the social intuitionist model, one feels a quick flash of revulsion at the 
thought of incest and one knows intuitively that something is wrong.”120  
When asked to justify one’s belief that something—like consensual, harm-
less incest—is wrong, “[o]ne puts forth argument after argument,” and be-
lieves that he is right “even after [his] last argument has been shot down.”121  
In the social intuitionist model it becomes plausible to say, “‘I don’t know, I 
can’t explain it, I just know it’s wrong.’”122  
Jonathan Haidt, a key exponent of this model, has used it to examine 
the source of moral angst over sexual taboos as well as to account for the 
various disagreements that have driven a wedge between political conserva-
tives and liberals over issues of sexual morality.123  For example, in one 
study, Haidt interviewed self-identified conservatives and liberals in order 
to measure their reactions to three harmless, yet “offensive,” sexual taboo 
violations—same-sex relations, masturbation (with a bestiality component), 
and consensual sibling incest—that were then further subdivided into six 
scenarios intended to elicit varying degrees of disgust.124  The results of the 
 
117  Haidt, The Emotional Dog, supra note 116, at 817; see also id. at 829 (“[T]he social intuitionist 
model . . . is not an antirationalist model.  It is a model about the complex and dynamic ways that intui-
tion, reasoning, and social influences interact to produce moral judgment.”).   
118  See id.; see also A. Angyal, Disgust and Related Aversions, 36 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
393 (1941) (analyzing the role that disgust plays in the formation of moral judgment). 
119  Haidt, The Emotional Dog, supra note 116, at 812. 
120  Id. 
121  Id. at 814. 
122  Id.   
123  See Jonathan Haidt & Matthew A. Hersh, Sexual Morality   The Cultures and Emotions of Con-
servatives and Liberals, 31 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 191 (2001).  
124  The six scenarios included:  a 27-year-old man having intercourse with a 25-year-old man who 
is his partner; a 30-year-old woman having oral sex with a 29-year-old woman who is her partner; a 34-
year-old woman who enjoys masturbating while cuddling with her favorite teddy bear; a 25-year-old 
man who prefers to masturbate while his dog willingly licks his (the man’s) genitals and seems to enjoy 
it; a 29-year-old man and his 26-year-old girlfriend who one day discover that they are half brother and 
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interviews supported Haidt’s thesis that moral judgment was driven more 
by the nonconsequentialist and emotional reactions of disgust/offensiveness 
than by perceptions of harm.125  His researchers found that conservatives 
and liberals both responded to the six scenarios in quick and immediate 
fashion, only later coming up with rationalizations such as “it is wrong be-
cause it is harmful” or “it is wrong because, well, it just is”—even when the 
interviewers called attention to the nonharmful aspects of each scenario.   
Haidt’s study shows that political conservatives and liberals differed 
most over their affective responses to the same-sex scenarios and least over 
their affective responses to the incest scenarios.126  Most striking, however, 
was the researchers’ conclusion that negative affect was the most significant 
predictor of moral judgment for both groups.  Whereas most liberals es-
poused a harm-based morality (i.e., only those actions that cause harm are 
immoral) and most conservatives espoused a broader morality (e.g., based 
on community norms and religious belief), for both groups, negative affect 
(or disgust) determined moral judgment more than any of the other predic-
tors in all of the scenarios—and particularly in the incest scenarios.  While 
conservatives and liberals disagreed most over their views toward same-sex 
relations, “[t]he liberal insistence that people have a right to do whatever 
they choose, so long as they don’t hurt anyone, did not extend to the power-
ful taboo against incest.”127  Haidt explains: 
[M]oral judgment was better predicted by participants’ emotional reactions 
than by their perceptions of harmfulness.  Harm was often cited, especially on 
the incest scenarios, but even there it was not a significant predictor of judg-
ment, once negative affect was included in the analysis.  This finding fits with 
the qualitative finding that participants often condemned the scenarios in-
stantly, and then seemed to search and stumble through sentences laced with 
pauses, “ums,” and “I don’t knows,” before producing a statement about harm.  
                                                                                                                           
sister (raised in separate families) but decide to continue their sexual relationship anyway, using a con-
dom; and a 25-year-old man and his 23-year-old adopted sister who decide to have sexual intercourse.  
See id. at 193. 
125  Haidt defines “affective condemnation” in terms synonymous with disgust:  “The following two 
quotes illustrate the [affective condemnation] code:  ‘It’s more along the gross lines, sort of repelling.  I 
just don’t think it’s normal’; and ‘That’s foul, that’s nasty.  I mean that’s not right.  That’s not right.’”  
Id. at 201.  To avoid a situation where one’s perception of harm (what Haidt calls a moral content code) 
was indistinguishable from one’s affective condemnation (harmful because disgusting and disgusting 
because harmful), the reliability of all codes for each participant was computed.  The interviewers also 
ran regression analyses in order to determine whether harm or negative affect was a greater predictor of 
moral judgment regarding sexual choices.  
126  For instance, whereas 0% of the liberals and 40% of conservatives interviewed exhibited a nega-
tive affective response to gay male sex, 8% of both liberals and conservatives interviewed exhibited a 
negative affective response to a sexual relationship between an adopted brother and sister.  Similarly, 
whereas 7% of the liberals and 60 % of the conservatives interviewed exhibited “dumbfounding,” or a 
confused inability to explain one’s position, with respect to gay male sex, 42% of the liberals and 50% 
of the conservatives interviewed exhibited a dumbfounding response with respect to the sexual relation-
ship between the siblings related by adoption.  See id. at 209.  
127  Id. at 213.  
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This general pattern of quick affective judgment and slow, awkward justifica-
tion fits well with an intuitionist model of moral judgment, while it does not fit 
well with models in which moral reasoning drives moral judgment.128  
Haidt concludes his study by suggesting that “the best way to change moral 
judgments may be to trigger competing moral intuitions” rather than by re-
lying on a process of argumentation that “does not cause people to change 
their minds,” but instead “forces them to work harder to find replacement 
arguments.”129 
Like Haidt, Joshua Greene, a researcher at Princeton’s Center for the 
Study of Brain, Mind, and Behavior, has conducted a series of magnetic 
resonance imaging (“MRI”) experiments that are designed to test the brain’s 
moral decisionmaking process.130  What Greene has found strongly supports 
Haidt’s theory behind the intuitionist model of moral decisionmaking.  Spe-
cifically, Greene has begun to uncover the distinctly neuronal foundation of 
moral judgments.  When posed a series of questions that implicated a wide 
spectrum of moral issues, volunteers participating in the experiments relied 
on those parts of the brain that produce emotions and feelings of disgust and 
anger significantly more than on those parts of the brain typically associated 
with the reasoning process.  Based on a variety of such experiments, Greene 
has concluded that emotions and intuitions play a critical—albeit underval-
ued—role in the formation of moral judgment.  He suggests that Hume, 
who believed that moral judgment derived partly from an “immediate feel-
ing and finer internal sense,” better captured the etiology of moral judgment 
than did the primary modern exponents of moral reasoning, Kant and Mill.   
An understanding of the intuitionist model of moral judgment, and of 
the pivotal role that emotions play in the decisionmaking process, is indis-
pensable to any inquiry into the relationship among disgust, incest, and per-
 
128  Id. at 214–15 (citations omitted). 
129  Id. at 218.  He continues:   
Just as a reversible figure in a perceptual psychology experiment can seem to flip back and forth 
between two stable interpretations, the conservative participants in the present study sometimes 
flipped back and forth between their intuitions that homosexuality was a private choice (ethics of 
autonomy) and their intuitions that it was a deviant or antisocial activity (ethics of community and 
divinity).  The question then becomes:  How does one get a person to ‘see’ a moral question in a 
new way? 
Id.  Haidt offers two suggestions for how to accomplish this:  (1) individuals on both sides of the debate 
(over, say, rights for same-sex couples) “should acknowledge the moral motivations of the other side 
[as] [c]oncessions generally lead to reciprocal concessions”; and (2)  
speakers, politicians, and opinion leaders should emphasize the common moral ground that can be 
found.  The ethics of autonomy are clearly shared by all Americans, but liberals will have to reach 
beyond this in some way to defuse the fear that conservatives have of a purely harm-based or 
rights-based morality. 
Id.  
130  Carl Zimmer, Whose Life Would You Save?, DISCOVER, April 2004, at 60 (interview with Joshua 
Greene), available at http://www.carlzimmer.com/articles/2004/articles_2004_Morality.html; see also 
Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For The Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS:  BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775 (2004).  
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ceptions of harmfulness for at least two reasons.  First, the model chal-
lenges the classic liberal or libertarian claim, enunciated by, and commonly 
associated with, John Stuart Mill, that the government’s only role in the 
community is the prevention of harm.131  The Millean position presupposes 
that, as long as an individual’s choices do not result in harm to others, the 
state must refrain from intruding upon or constricting them—including, 
presumably, choices pertaining to one’s sexuality or sexual behavior.  This 
classic harm-based, or consequentialist, position has been widely embraced 
in American law.  Indeed, one might even say that it has shaped the Su-
preme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence and was an integral 
feature of the majority’s opinion in Lawrence.132  The intuitionist model, 
however, not only questions the importance of harm in the formation of 
moral judgment, but also suggests that the classic liberal paradigm is pre-
scriptive of the way people should think rather than descriptive of the way 
they do think.   
For instance, one might argue that it is possible to draw a line on the 
slippery slope (from sodomy to incest or from same-sex marriage to inces-
tuous marriage) at the point where one’s sexual preferences or sexual 
choices inflict harm on others.  At first glance, this position would appear to 
defuse the slippery slope argument by providing a firm toehold on the slope 
itself:  of course we are not going to slip down the slope to incest because, 
given our Millean leanings, we know that a line can be drawn at harm, 
whether that harm is the coercive nature of any incestuous act or the in-
creased biological risk that consanguineous reproduction poses.  The intu-
itionist model, however, suggests that whether a line theoretically can be 
drawn on the slippery slope is of little to no consequence, for individuals 
will inevitably find that certain sexual taboos—same-sex relations, but in-
cest more so—are worthy of our moral condemnation regardless of whether 
they cause harm to others.  The consensual incest encounters in Haidt’s 
study offer representative examples of precisely this phenomenon.  While 
harm was one predictor of moral judgment, it paled in comparison to the 
more decisive role of negative affect.  These empirically-based conclusions, 
which suggest that morality is driven largely by disgust, are more in line 
with Lord Patrick Devlin’s assertion that disgust is among the primary 
“forces behind the moral law”133 than with Mill’s harm principle.   
Second, and more relevant here, the intuitionist model provides an ex-
planation for why the incest taboo has continued to remain a key player in 
the culture wars over sexuality, despite the fact that not all incest causes 
 
131  See MILL, supra note 20, passim. 
132  That said, McDonnell points out that “the Court [n]ever explicitly state[s] that the government 
can only criminalize behavior that causes harm to others.”  McDonnell, supra note 12, at 355. 
133  PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 17 (1965).  Interpreting this passage, Nuss-
baum remarks that Devlin’s “entire argument is directed against Mill’s contention that only . . . harm 
justifies legal regulation”.  NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 102, at 78.  
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harm.134  As Haidt points out, incest was the only sexual taboo in his study 
that elicited extreme affective condemnation or disgust from political con-
servatives and liberals alike.  That moral disapprobation for incest super-
sedes political affiliation offers one possible explanation for why incest has 
maintained its position at the bottom of the slippery slope—namely, be-
cause everybody is repulsed by it.  The conservative juxtaposition of same-
sex relations and incest is thus an opportune way of winning the debate over 
same-sex marriage by alerting opponents that incest is disgusting and must 
therefore be avoided at all costs—even if that means that some advocates of 
same-sex marriage might end up sacrificing a cause which they tend to sup-
port.135  In this sense, incest performs the powerful role of contaminating 
anything that becomes associated with it.  As I will suggest in the next Part, 
placing incest alongside other taboos (same-sex relations, miscegenation, 
cloning) makes those taboos start to look more and more like incest.136   
Because harm is an incomplete way of explaining the potency of the 
incest taboo, we must turn to other theories in order to account for the ex-
treme disgust that incest provokes.  In the next Part, I shall set forth one 
possible theory of disgust that more fully captures the reasons why the in-
cest taboo has come to symbolize any non-normative family arrangement 
and why it has surfaced during moments of perceived crisis (on the slippery 
slope) when the law demands a clear-cut definition of the family.   
IV. INCEST AND THE LOGIC OF DISGUST 
Among the many possible reasons why individuals find incest—and 
the other taboos to which it is (or was) compared—to be a source of disgust, 
is the extent to which it represents an archetypal form of boundary viola-
tion.  Section A will provide the critical background in support of this the-
ory.  Section B will then apply this theory to incest specifically.  Section C 
will again rely on this theory to explain how, and why, incest has func-
tioned as a point of comparison to other non-normative family arrange-
ments.  This more comprehensive theory of incest as a prototypical symbol 
of boundary violation will help to explain why incest has continued to re-
main a monolithic taboo on the slippery slope—the incest taboo—in spite 
of the problems of the “slippery slope to incest” formulation highlighted in 
Part II.   
 
134  Consider, for instance, the consensual—and thus otherwise harmless—sexual relationship be-
tween adoptive siblings in Israel v. Allen, or the consensual sexual relationship between the biologically-
related brother and sister in In re Tiffany Nicole M., a relationship that produced three children free from 
genetic abnormalities. 
135  This is primarily an issue that affects those individuals who are “on the fence,” so to speak.  
136  See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 24 (examining this process of “contamination” and its po-
litical consequences). 
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A. Disgust and Boundary Violation 
Paul Rozin, among the first scholars to lend intellectual respectability 
to the study of disgust, once remarked to an interviewer that “[d]isgust 
evolves culturally, and develops from a system to protect the body from 
harm to a system to protect the soul from harm.”137  Rozin’s inquiry into the 
nature of disgust starts with what he refers to as the core “elicitors” of dis-
gust, including food, body products, and certain animals and their wastes.138  
Moving centrifugally out from these core elicitors, Rozin identifies addi-
tional corporeally-related, disgust-eliciting phenomena, including “sexual 
behaviors, contact with death or corpses, violations of the exterior envelope 
of the body (including gore and deformity) [and] poor hygiene.”139  Rozin 
and his colleagues have concluded that these disgust elicitors share a com-
mon theoretical substrate, namely, they all constitute “reminders of our 
animal vulnerability” and serve to “humanize our animal bodies.”140 
According to Rozin, our revulsion reflexes are not limited to these 
largely physical and bodily phenomena, but extend to social phenomena as 
well, including “interpersonal contamination (contact with unsavory human 
beings) and certain moral offenses.”141  While the “presumed origin of dis-
gust [is] a rejection response to bad tastes, in the service of protecting the 
body,” it branches out to encompass a range of cultural and moral activity, 
such that disgust might be conceived of as serving the purpose of “protect-
ing the soul.”142  In fact, Rozin explains that “[w]hen we elicited lists of dis-
gusting things from North American and Japanese informants, we found 
that the majority of instances referred to moral offenses.”143  For instance, a 
high number of informants alternatively characterized racists, Republicans, 
and liberals as “disgusting.”144  Furthermore, Rozin notes that “the broad 
expansion of the word ‘disgusting’ into the sociomoral domain” is not sim-
ply a metaphorical extension of the “core” feeling of disgust; nor is it 
unique to the English language, but rather it characterizes a number of lan-
guages and cultures.145  As with the core disgust elicitors, sociomoral dis-
gust arises from a fear of boundary violation (and ensuing contamination) 
 
137  John Wilson, You Stink, Therefore I Am   Philosophers Ponder the Meaning of Disgust, BOSTON 
GLOBE, May 2, 2004, at D1; see also NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 102, at 89 (ob-
serving that the “motivating idea” behind Rozin’s theory of disgust “has to do with our interest in polic-
ing the boundary between ourselves and nonhuman animals, or our own animality”). 
138  Paul Rozin, Jonathan Haidt, & Clark P. McCajuley, Disgust, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 637, 
640 (M. Lewis & M. Haviland-Jones eds., 2d ed. 2000). 
139  Id. at 637; see also id. at 638 (locating the origin of disgust in reactions to taste and noting the 
etymology of “disgust,” de-gustare or that which is offensive to the taste).  
140  Id. at 642 (internal quotations omitted).  
141  Id. at 637.  
142  Id.  
143  Id. at 643.  
144  Id.  
145  Id. 
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and necessitates the imposition of boundaries in the human body-politic.  
Although Rozin and his colleagues thus locate the origin of disgust in a 
“particular motivational system (hunger) and . . . a particular part of the 
body (mouth),” they also underscore the distinctly social and cultural func-
tions of a more fully developed sense of disgust—noting that “along with 
fear, [disgust] is a primary means for socialization.”146  A more common ex-
ample might be the way in which the word “dirty,” which denotes the actual 
substance of dirt, has expanded to connote that which is metaphorically un-
clean and that which sullies in a moral sense (e.g., dirty magazines, dirty 
talk, dirty sex).   
Anthropologists and researchers in other fields have also called atten-
tion to the relationship among disgust, socialization, contamination, and 
boundary maintenance.  Most notably, in her seminal work, Purity and 
Danger:  An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo,147 Mary 
Douglas elucidates the greater social function of ritualistic pollution behav-
iors.  Like Rozin, Douglas highlights the relationship between disgust and 
the socialization process, maintaining that “pollutions are used as analogies 
for expressing a general view of the social order.”148  Specifically, “our pol-
lution behaviour is the reaction which condemns any object or idea likely to 
confuse or contradict cherished classifications.”149  More than Rozin, Doug-
las conceptualizes the sociomoral domain of disgust within the larger con-
text of boundary maintenance.150  As creatures of order and “tidiness” with 
an obsessive need to classify and categorize, humans are compelled to draw 
boundaries and to banish the anomaly; that is, anything that does not quite 
conform to the bounded space that we have fashioned: 
In a chaos of shifting impressions, each of us constructs a stable world in 
which objects have recognizable shapes, are located in depth, and have perma-
nence.  In perceiving we are building, taking some cues and rejecting others.  
The most acceptable cues are those which fit most easily into the pattern that is 
being built up.  Ambiguous cues tend to be treated as if they harmonized with 
the rest of the pattern.  Discordant cues tend to be rejected.  If they are ac-
cepted, the structure of assumptions has to be modified.  As learning proceeds 
 
146  Id. at 638.  
147  MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER:  AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION AND 
TABOO (1966).  
148  Id. at 3. 
149  Id. at 36.  
150  Nussbaum maintains that Rozin’s empirically-based theory of disgust is  
clearly preferable to its most famous theoretical alternative, Mary Douglas’s theory of purity and 
danger.  For Douglas, disgust and impurity are socially contextual notions, and the guiding idea is 
that of an anomaly.  An object may be pure in one context, impure in another:  what makes it im-
pure-disgusting is its violation of socially-imposed boundaries.  Douglas’s theory does important 
work in making us aware of social factors surrounding disgust . . . .  Nonetheless, the theory has a 
number of defects that make it problematic as an account of disgust, however insightful it may be 
about the operation of taboos and prohibitions. 
NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 102, at 91.   
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objects are named.  Their names then affect the way they are perceived the 
next time:  once labeled they are more quickly slotted into the pigeon holes in 
the future.  As time goes on and experiences pile up, we make a greater and 
greater investment in our system of labels.  So a conservative bias is built in.  
It gives us confidence.151 
Among her more specific case examples of the practical function of 
boundary control, Douglas points to the North African Nuers, whose taboos 
against incest and adultery ensure the stability and structure of marriage as 
an exogamic necessity.152  Douglas’s analysis of taboos underscores a key 
feature of taboos and pollution rituals, namely, the importance of border 
control and policing the line separating this from that, us from them.  Her 
description of the boundary maintenance function of taboos and pollution 
rituals predates what Pierre Schlag has later referred to as one of the law’s 
foundational aesthetics, the aesthetic of the grid.  More precisely, Schlag 
invokes the metaphor of the grid to conceptualize a mode of legal organiza-
tion, just as Douglas earlier invoked the same metaphor to conceptualize a 
mode of social organization.  Specifically, Schlag notes that the “principal 
role of the judge in the grid aesthetic is to police the grid.”  He further re-
marks that this prototypical “grid thinker is preoccupied with the proper lo-
cation and maintenance of boundaries:  ‘Where do we draw the line?’  ‘Will 
the line hold?’  ‘How do we avoid the slippery slope?’”153  In fact, Schlag’s 
description of the grid aesthetic and its penchant for “tidiness” not only re-
veals the role that the slippery slope performs in the politics of disgust, but 
also recalls Douglas’s description of the boundary control function of taboo 
and its protective guard against contamination.  He continues: 
Understandably, the recurrent contact with societal untidiness elicits in legal 
professionals a desire for an antiseptic law.  The grid can be seen as an attempt 
to shield the lawyer, the judge, and the law itself from contamination.  In this 
light, the grid can be seen as an attempt to ward off contamination.  The most 
prestigious precincts of the law are the most antiseptic, the most clearly 
marked off from the mess. . . . Both the appellate judge and the academic can 
become entranced with maintaining or perfecting the grid at the expense of at-
tending to its worldly implications.  This is the allure of law cast as geometry.  
 
151  DOUGLAS, supra note 147, at 36.  Douglas’s “conservative bias” that “gives us confidence” per-
forms a role not unlike that of stare decisis in American law.  See Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of 
American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1059 (2002) (discussing the legal “aesthetic” of stare decisis).  
152  “The integrity of the [Nuer] social structure is very much at issue when breaches of the adultery 
and incest rules are made, for the local structure consists entirely of categories of persons defined by in-
cest regulations, marriage payments and marital status.”  DOUGLAS, supra note 147, at 131.  
153  Schlag, supra note 151, at 1059.  Douglas identifies four kinds of social pollution that are con-
ceived in grid-like terms:   
The first is danger pressing on external boundaries; the second, danger from transgressing the in-
ternal lines of the system; the third, danger in the margins of the lines.  The fourth is danger from 
internal contradiction, when some of the basic postulates are denied by other basic postulates, so 
that at certain points the system seems to be at war with itself. 
DOUGLAS, supra note 147, at 122–24.   
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This is the formalist orientation par excellence:  the dominance of concern 
with maintaining the proper form and order of law in terms of its own crite-
ria.154 
The similarities between Douglas’s analysis of taboo and Schlag’s ar-
ticulation of one of the law’s foundational aesthetics highlight the extent to 
which taboo and disgust are constitutive of the law as well as the meta-
phors—slippery slopes, line drawing—in which it speaks.155  This peculiar 
relationship between sexual taboo and border control (or policing the line) 
is perhaps nowhere more clearly dramatized in the law governing sexuality 
than in the recent expansion of state “mini-DOMAs” and state constitu-
tional amendments as a means of ensuring that state recognition of one sex-
ual taboo—in that case, same-sex marriage—does not “seep over” the 
borders and contaminate less tolerant states. 
More recent inquiries into the etiology of disgust have expanded on 
Douglas’s original formulation of taboo as a kind of boundary control as 
well as on Rozin’s understanding of the relationship between disgust and 
the socialization process.  William Ian Miller, for instance, posits that dis-
gust “is especially useful and necessary as a builder of moral and social 
community.  It performs this function obviously by helping define and lo-
cate the boundary separating our group from their group, purity from pollu-
tion, the violable from the inviolable.”156  Summarizing the pioneering work 
of Rozin and others, Miller points out that disgust performs the function of 
conveying a negative emotion toward the incorporation or assimilation of a 
contaminant.  More important, though, Miller, like Rozin before him, dem-
onstrates the extent to which disgust performs the related, but more overtly 
political and social functions of maintaining rank and hierarchy.  He elabo-
rates as follows: 
Our very core, our soul, is hemmed in by barriers of disgust, and one does not 
give them up unless one is in love or is held at the point of a gun.  In fact, the 
claim seems to be that the core or the essence of one’s identity can only be 
known as a consequence of which passions are triggered in its defense.  Dis-
 
154  Schlag, supra note 151, at 1060–61.  
155  Schlag’s description of the law’s obsession with classification also resonates with Douglas’s un-
derstanding of the role that classification plays in taboo rituals.  Schlag notes,  
One of the ironic byproducts of the effort to police and maintain the grid is that this activity ends 
up producing a plurality of grids—a multitude of different classification schemes.  The prolifera-
tion of sundry classification schemes in the early twentieth century was intense.  In fact, ‘classifi-
cation’ itself became a subject of inquiry, controversy, and of course, ultimately classification 
itself. 
Id. at 1062–63.   
156  WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 194–95 (1997); see also Mona Lynch, Pedo-
philes and Cyber-predators as Contaminating Forces   The Language of Disgust, Pollution, and Bound-
ary Invasions in Federal Debates on Sex Offender Legislation, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 529, 532 (2002) 
(arguing that sex offender lawmaking “is seeped in a constellation of emotional expressions of disgust, 
fear of contagion, and pollution avoidance, manifested in a legislative concern about boundary vulner-
abilities between social spheres of the pure and the dangerous”). 
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gust’s durability, its relative lack of responsiveness to the will, suits it well to 
its role as the maintainer of the continuity of our core character across social 
and moral domains.  Our durable self is defined as much by disgust as by any 
other passion.  Disgust defines many of our tastes, our sexual proclivities, and 
our choices of intimates.  It installs large chunks of the moral world right at the 
core of our identity, seamlessly uniting body and soul and thereby giving an ir-
reducible continuity to our characters.157 
To be sure, certain aspects of Miller’s evaluation and taxonomy of dis-
gust warrant criticism.  For instance, his largely unsupported claim that se-
men is not only repulsive, but also perhaps one possible source for 
misogyny—as he remarks, “[m]ale disgust with semen . . . bears no small 
connection with misogyny . . . .  Men can never quite believe that women 
aren’t as revolted by semen as men feel they should be”—is, to say the 
least, somewhat questionable and open to debate.158  Nevertheless, his 
analysis overall is descriptively useful insofar as it highlights the dual func-
tion of disgust:  its ability at once to separate (to draw boundaries between 
and among individuals and groups) and to unite (“hemming in” and “seam-
lessly uniting body and soul” as well as individuals within the community 
at large).  As one scholar has explained the unlikely conflation of sexual of-
fenses in Deuteronomy and Leviticus, including incest, same-sex relations, 
bestiality, and adultery, “all these offenses have this in common:  not sepa-
rating that which should be separated, mixing that which should be kept 
apart, and confusing genera, sexes, kinship, and alliance.”159  Or, as Julia 
Kristeva has remarked with respect to these same biblical abominations, 
“[t]he pure will be that which conforms to an established taxonomy; the 
impure, that which unsettles it, establishes intermixture and disorder.”160 
 
157  MILLER, supra note 156, at 250–51. 
158  Id. at 104; see also id. at 105 (“Semen . . . disgusts because it is sexual, fertilizing, and reproduc-
tive.  Its way of feminization is rather different from castration’s way, but it need be no less sadistic for 
all that.”).  Whereas chapter 15 of Leviticus explicitly states that “[w]hen any man has a discharge issu-
ing from his member, he is unclean,” see TANAKH—THE HOLY SCRIPTURES 179 (Jewish Pub’n Soc’y, 
1985), it places the “discharge” from men and women on an equal footing and nowhere suggests that the 
former renders the person who comes into contact with it any more feminine for doing so.  Indeed, the 
biblical text makes clear that the man and woman who have carnal relations (and thereby come into con-
tact with the “unclean” discharge) are equally unclean:  “When a man has an emission of semen, he shall 
bathe his whole body in water and remain unclean until evening . . . .  And if a man has carnal relations 
with a woman, they shall bathe in water and remain unclean until evening.”  Id. at 179 (emphasis added).  
In other words, nothing in the text suggests that women (and, by extension, any recipient of ejaculate) 
are rendered that much more unclean than men with respect to the “contaminating” effect of semen.  
Both man and woman remain “unclean” until the process of purification takes place.  See also JULIA 
KRISTEVA, POWERS OF HORROR:  AN ESSAY ON ABJECTION 71 (Leon S. Roudiez trans., 1982) 
(“[P]olluting objects fall, schematically, into two types:  excremental and menstrual.  Neither tears nor 
sperm, for instance, although they belong to the borders of the body, have any polluting value.”).   
159  FRANÇOISE HÉRITIER, TWO SISTERS AND THEIR MOTHER:  THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF INCEST 288 
(Jeanine Herman trans., 2002).  
160  KRISTEVA, supra note 158, at 98.  
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This boundary control theory is a particularly useful way of critiquing 
not only the position that incest occupies on the slippery slope, but also the 
association made between incest and other forms of sexual (and reproduc-
tive) deviance.  We might even say that the slippery slope, which itself 
lacks fixed boundaries (it is, after all, a slope) and which suggests an immi-
nent slip into the vast unknown, is the ideal rhetorical device or vehicle for 
conveying disgust.  The slippery slope often assumes a world lacking in dif-
ference and distinction—because A is too much like B, we cannot allow 
A—features which, I have shown, characterize disgust.  It is not surprising, 
then, that slippery slope arguments often appear in debates surrounding ta-
booed forms of sexuality and the revulsion they elicit and that incest has 
figured so prominently in slippery slope rhetoric.   
B. Incest and Boundary Violation 
One way to approach the question of how incest represents a prototypi-
cal form of boundary violation is to return to Douglas’s conceptualization 
of disgust (or pollution behavior) as a reaction against that which defies or 
confuses our “cherished classifications.”  Specifically, in the same quota-
tion excerpted above, Douglas calls attention to the causal relationship that 
exists between taboo and naming.  She notes, 
[As] learning proceeds objects are named.  Their names then affect the way 
they are perceived next time:  once labeled  they are more speedily slotted into 
the pigeon holes in the future.  As time goes on and experiences pile up, we 
make a greater and greater investment in our system of labels.161   
Douglas’s examination of the naming process is a useful heuristic by 
which to approach the peculiar relationship that exists between names—or 
naming—and incest as well as the theoretical claim that naming and the in-
cest taboo often go hand in hand.  Indeed, scholars from a number of differ-
ent disciplines have taken up Claude Lévi-Strauss’s suggestion, made in 
1949, that only by “pursuing the comparison” between language and the in-
cest taboo can we “hope to get to the meaning of the institution” of exo-
gamic marriage and of the role that the taboo plays in ensuring that 
institution.162 
For instance, psychologists have remarked that familial names—
mother, father, sister, brother—perform a prescriptive as well as a descrip-
tive function.  One scholar comments that “[t]he incest taboo exerts its ef-
fect on the use of names,” specifically, that 
[w]ith the use of the terms “mother” and “father” instead of proper names such 
as Sally and John, one is describing a part of the individual, a function (one 
who mothers or fathers), and not the total person including his feelings, sexual-
 
161  DOUGLAS, supra note 147, at 36. 
162  CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP 495 (James Harle Bell et 
al. trans., 1949). 
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ity, desires, etc.  Using the mother’s proper name would make her too much 
like a “real” person or a peer, with whom all is possible, and the incestuous 
conflict together with wishes and anxieties would be reawakened . . . .  This 
verbal institution serves to maintain and support the incest taboo.163 
Similarly, anthropologists have noted that “[t]he naming function of 
language by which we assert the father/mother/sister/brother/uncle/aunt/ 
cousin placement may well be one of the strongest announcers and enforc-
ers of the taboo.”164  This idea that intrafamilial naming represents a “semi-
otics of incest”165 resonates with Douglas’s observation that language 
constructs categories which, in turn, reinforce social behavior.  In other 
words, “[t]he process of naming is the process of categorizing, which is the 
unconscious establishment of limits, in [the case of the incest taboo] sexual 
limits.”166  Indeed, it is this very relationship between naming and taboo that 
prompted anthropologist David Schneider to remark that incest represents a 
way of acting “ungrammatically.”167   
The disgust triggered by incest derives from precisely this sense of 
name or boundary violation:  One should not be in a sexual relationship 
with someone whom they call brother or sister (or mother, or father, etc.).  
Even brothers and sisters who are not biologically related but fully natural-
ized into the family unit—say, through adoption, the aim of which is to in-
corporate the child into the “natural” family168—become part of these 
nominal categories that comprise the “semiotics of incest.”169  In families 
where adopted children and siblings are fully naturalized into the family, 
one would suspect that this naming function would work in the same way to 
enforce the taboo against sexual relations.  Such a claim is supported by 
empirical evidence, for in Haidt’s study, the adopted brother and sister sex-
ual scenario elicited nearly the same degree of disgust as did the scenario 
involving siblings who were related by blood through one parent.170  How-
ever, in families where adopted children are not considered to be fully natu-
ralized into the family, one would suspect that the naming function does not 
 
163  M.J. Weich, The Terms “Mother” and “Father” as a Defense Against Incest, 16 J. AM. 
PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS’N 783, 787 (1968).  
164  JAMES TWITCHELL, FORBIDDEN PARTNERS:  THE INCEST TABOO IN MODERN CULTURE 9 (1987); 
see also KAREN MEISELMAN, INCEST:  A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS WITH 
TREATMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 19 (1978) (stating that “[c]reation of the incest taboo was made possi-
ble by, and probably coincided with, the development of language”).  For a more in-depth treatment of 
the relationship between language and sexual prohibition, see Courtney Cahill, “That Which is Our 
Bane, That Alone We Have in Common,” Incest, Intimacy, and the Crisis of Naming, J.L., POL., AND 
SOC. 3, 8–23 (2000). 
165  TWITCHELL, supra note 164, at 9.  
166  Id. 
167  Schneider, supra note 1, at 166. 
168  See Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes for the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1144 (2003). 
169  TWITCHELL, supra note 164, at 9.   
170  See Haidt, The Emotional Dog, supra note 116. 
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operate in the same way.  As legal commentators have argued, one of the 
reasons why some states do not apply their incest prohibitions to adopted 
brothers and sisters, to stepsiblings (related only by marriage), or to both is 
because the law in these states still does not consider those individuals to be 
naturalized into the family unit—and, by extension, a “real” family in the 
normative sense.171   
The Israel decision represents a good example of this phenomenon.  
There, the Colorado Supreme Court employed a botanical metaphor to sug-
gest that adopted children do not become fully naturalized into the family 
tree, stating that “adopted children are not engrafted upon their adoptive 
families for all purposes.”172  The Israel court’s repetition of the phrase 
“adopted brother and sister” and “brother and sister related only by adop-
tion” suggests that the semiotics of incest did not apply there because the 
court was dealing with an “adopted brother” and an “adopted sister,” rather 
than a real “brother” and “sister.”173  The fact that the court found otherwise 
reveals the pivotal role that the law plays in creating these names, catego-
ries, and the legal relationships that they signify.   
In addition to the rich anthropological literature on the subject, judges, 
policymakers, and even poets have elucidated the relationship that exists 
between naming and the incest taboo.  Their observations reveal the extent 
to which the disgust that incest provokes derives from the fact that bounda-
ries have been violated and those “cherished classifications” that we live by 
have been called into question.174  
For instance, in upholding laws criminalizing incest against constitu-
tional challenge, courts have underscored the extent to which incest leads to 
a confusion of names and roles within the family.  As one court noted:   
Prevention of mutated birth is only one reason for these statutes.  The crime is 
also punished to promote and protect family harmony, to protect children from 
the abuse of parental authority, and because society cannot function in an or-
derly manner when age distinctions, generations, sentiments and roles in fami-
lies are in conflict.175 
Other courts have similarly observed that, rather than representing an 
instinctual aversion or a guard against genetic abnormalities, the primary 
function of the incest taboo is to maintain the nominal and symbolic hierar-
 
171  See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 168, at 1139 (“Because courts and legislatures have focused on the 
differences between biological and adoptive families, rather than on the similarities of the parent-child 
relationships, they have not treated incest within adoptive families as punitively as incest within biologi-
cal families.  Indeed, differential definitions of incestuous relationships continue today in both the civil 
and criminal law. The incest cases ultimately show that the legal recognition of adoption should not 
translate into identical regulation of adoptive families.”).  
172  Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762, 764 (Colo. 1978) (emphasis added). 
173  Id. 
174  DOUGLAS, supra note 147, at 37. 
175  State v. Kaiser, 663 P.2d 839, 843 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added).   
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chy of the family unit.176  For instance, in Benton v. State, the Georgia Su-
preme Court remarked that the incest taboo does not reflect an innate re-
pugnance to incestuous relationships, but rather polices boundaries by 
forcing “family members to go outside their families to find sexual partners.  
Requiring people to pursue relationships outside family boundaries helps to 
form important economic and political alliances, and makes a larger society 
possible.”177  In addition, the taboo helps to maintain “the stability of the 
family hierarchy by protecting young family members from exploitation by 
older family members in positions of authority, and by reducing competi-
tion and jealous friction among family members.”178 
The relationship between the incest taboo and the maintenance of 
names and the familial hierarchy has been conveyed in more poetic fashion 
by one of the more infamous figures in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Myrrha, 
who repeatedly tricks her father into having sex with her—and who eventu-
ally turns into a tree as a form of punishment for her deceit.179  While 
contemplating the possibility of father-daughter incest early in Ovid’s 
narrative of forbidden desire, Myrrha conjures up an absurd world where 
incest dissolves linguistic boundaries and the relationships that they signify.  
As she soliloquizes:  “But can you hope for aught else, unnatural girl?  
Think how many ties, how many names you are confusing!  Will you be the 
rival of your mother, the mistress of your father?  Will you be called the 
sister of your son, the mother of your brother?”180  For Myrrah, incest is 
unnatural not because of the desire itself—as she proclaims earlier in her 
soliloquy, the natural love that exists between father and daughter is merely 
increased or “twinned” by a sexual bond—but rather because of the 
unnatural crisis of naming and the dissolution of the familial hierarchy that 
it produces.  Ovid’s legendary narrative of father-daughter incest is not the 
only story in the Metamorphoses to explore the subject of forbidden desire 
in terms that suggest boundary violation and name confusion.  To the 
contrary, Ovid similarly conceptualizes a number of sexual relationships in 
the Metamorphoses that are either in fact incestuous or described in 
language evocative of incest, including twin brother-sister incest, self-love, 
and artistic creation.  In all of these narratives, Ovid makes clear that the 
nominal transgression—e.g., what to “call” your brother should he become 
your lover—is an indispensable part of the sexual transgression.181   
 
176  See, e.g., Smith v. State, 6 S.W.3d 512, 520 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).  
177  Benton v. State, 461 S.E.2d 202, 205 (Ga. 1995) (Sears, J., concurring). 
178  Id. 
179  1 & 2 OVID, THE METAMORPHOSES (Frank Justus Miller trans., 3rd ed. Loeb Classical Library 
1977). 
180  Id. at 10.345– 348.  
181  See generally Cahill, supra note 164.  Interestingly, the same name/role confusion that causes or 
leads to disgust may also constitute a source of attraction.  As mentioned, Myrrha proclaims that love for 
a family member merely increases—or “doubles”—the natural love that already exists:  “And yet they 
say that there are tribes among whom mother with son, daughter with father mates, so that natural love is 
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The theory of incest and disgust that I have proposed here reveals the 
extent to which disgust is a socially-contingent category, dependent on how 
we choose to categorize and name objects and people.  In other words, that 
which is an object of disgust in one social context might be entirely accept-
able—even encouraged—in another.182  But what does this theory of disgust 
tell us about the incest taboo specifically?  On the most basic level, it sug-
gests that, even as the incest taboo appears on the slippery slope as some-
thing monolithic (the incest taboo) and is thought to derive from an 
instinctive sense of repugnance, the horror surrounding incest is in many 
ways socially determined.  For instance, while the thought of brother-sister 
incest might provoke horror for some, for others it is an entirely natural 
manifestation of desire.  As Nussbaum has characterized Siegmund’s love 
for his twin sister, Sieglinde, in Wagner’s Die Walkure, the “lovers are 
drawn to one another not in spite of the tie, but precisely because of it:  they 
seem to see their own faces in one another, and to hear their own voices.”183  
Indeed, one would be misguided to argue that certain individuals lack the 
“instinct” to refrain from committing incest.  As the Benton court remarked, 
“people generally are incapable of violating their instincts.”184  Or, as Fran-
çoise Héritier has argued in her cross-cultural examination of the incest ta-
boo:  
One might . . . consider Sir James Frazer’s counterargument:  Why would a 
deep human instinct need to be reinforced by law?  What nature forbids and 
punishes does not require a law as well.  There is no law obliging people to eat 
or drink, preventing them from placing their hands in fire, and so on.  The very 
existence of a legal ban would, on the contrary, lead one to infer the existence 
of a natural instinct toward incest.  We know the use Sigmund Freud made of 
this argument in Totem and Taboo.185 
The claim that the incest taboo is more nurture than nature supports the 
observations made in Parts I and II of this Article with respect to the posi-
tion that the incest taboo maintains at the bottom of the slippery slope.  
                                                                                                                           
increased by the double bond.” OVID, supra note 179, at 10.324–.333.  In a previous article, and to a 
lesser extent here, I argued that incest has been portrayed in literature generally, and in Ovid’s Meta-
morphoses specifically, as a crime of desiring that which approximates and resembles oneself—a trope 
that finds its most literal expression in the Ovidian characters of Caunus and Byblis, a twin brother-sister 
pair, the sister of whom desires her brother precisely because he is so similar to her.  While the law more 
often than not treats this source of attraction as a failure of boundary maintenance—and, therefore, an 
elicitor of disgust—it has at least one time recognized that incestuous desire can constitute a natural ex-
tension of the affection that already exists.  Specifically, in considering whether to recognize a marriage 
between an aunt and a nephew that was contracted in Italy, the New York Court of Domestic Relations 
in Incuria v. Incuria suggested that the incestuous relationship was the natural outgrowth of the familial 
one:  “There was probably affection between the parties; that would naturally flow from the relationship 
existing between them.”  280 N.Y.S. 716, 718 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1935) (emphasis added).   
182  See infra note 186.   
183  NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 102, at 81.   
184  Benton v. State, 461 S.E.2d 202, 205 (Ga. 1995) (Sears, J., concurring). 
185  HÉRITIER, supra note 159, at 17 (emphasis added).   
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Specifically, I suggested there that while the taboo might function in slip-
pery slope arguments as something staid and untouchable (again, the incest 
taboo), the law of incest suggests that it is less definite, more wide-ranging, 
and society specific.  What may be deemed incestuous (and thus prohibited) 
in one state or country may be permitted—indeed, encouraged—in an-
other.186  Despite this definitional variety, however, the incest taboo contin-
ues to appear in slippery slope rhetoric as a single and monolithic taboo.  In 
looking more closely at the way in which the incest taboo has been used to 
articulate an ideal vision of the family in Part V, I shall return to this notion 
that the definition of incest is a prescriptive, ideological choice rather than a 
factual description of the way in which families naturally operate. 
In addition, this theory of disgust as a form of boundary violation helps 
to explain why incest has been compared to other non-normative behav-
iors—including, at one time, miscegenation, and, more recently, same-sex 
relations and cloning.  I have already examined the incest-same-sex-
relations parallel to some extent throughout this Article, and will return to 
this comparison in Part V.  Here, I turn to comparisons between incest and 
the two other non-normative kinship arrangements.  I contend that the in-
cest-miscegenation and incest-cloning analogies help to bring into focus the 
peculiar boundary violation that incest represents and the disgust that it 
provokes.  Furthermore, an examination of these analogies provides a con-
text in which to discuss, and ultimately to criticize, the way in which the in-
cest taboo has been used to define acceptable forms of sexuality and 
kinship. 
C. The Incest-Miscegenation/Cloning Analogies 
1. Incest-Miscegenation Analogy.—As discussed in Part I, incest 
once played a key role on—or at the bottom of—the slippery slope from 
miscegenation to incest.  Prior to Loving v. Virginia, incest was not only a 
feared result of the decriminalization of miscegenation, but was, in fact, 
used synonymously with that term.  Most remarkably, in his Treatise on 
Sociology:  Theoretical and Practical, written in 1852, white supremacist 
and pro-slavery apologist, Henry Hughes, proclaimed that interracial and 
intrafamilial sexual relations and marriage were alike incestuous: 
 
186  In some countries, certain forms of consanguineous marriage and mating are not only permitted 
but desirable.  See, e.g., A. Bittles, Consanguinity and Its Relevance to Clinical Genetics, 60 CLINICAL 
GENETICS 89, 91 (2001) (“Dravidian South Indians regard consanguineous marriage as preferential, 
whereas in North India consanguinity is prohibited under the Aryan Hindu tradition . . . .  Like Hindu-
ism, there are conflicting attitudes and opinions in Christianity, with specific dispensation required by 
the Roman Catholic Church for first cousin marriages, and even more rigorous proscription in the Or-
thodox Church.  By comparison, the Protestant denominations basically follow the Judaic guidelines laid 
down in Leviticus 18:7–18, with consanguineous unions up to and including first cousins permissible.”); 
see also id. at 91 (“[S]ome land-owning families also favour consanguineous unions as a means of pre-
serving the integrity of their estates.”).  
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Races must not be wronged.  Hygienic progress is a right.  It is a right, because 
a duty.  But hygienic progress forbids ethnical regress.  Morality therefore, 
which commands generally progress, prohibits this special regress.  The pres-
ervation and progress of a race, is a moral duty of the races.  Degeneration is 
evil.  It is a sin.  That sin is extreme. 
 Hybridism is heinous.  Impurity of races is against the law of nature.  Mu-
lattoes are monsters.  The law of nature is the law of God.  The same law 
which forbids consanguineous amalgamation forbids ethnical amalgamation.  
Both are incestuous.  Amalgamation is incest.187 
Hughes’s rhetoric reveals the extent to which miscegenation and incest 
were seen to be not just similar to each other—objects of frequent compari-
son and juxtaposition—as so-called biological hazards, but, in fact, indis-
tinguishable from each other.188   
Incest and miscegenation were together considered to be dangerous 
solvents of the well-policed boundaries that guaranteed one’s biological, 
social, and even proprietary inheritance; in fact, the taboo against one was 
often used to sustain the taboo against the other.  These complementary 
prohibitions against intrafamilial and interracial marriage—both of which, 
curiously, were referred to as “intermarriage”—were often juxtaposed as 
“crimes of blood” in state statutory schemes and judicial decisions.   
For instance, a Mississippi statute from 1880 suggested that interracial 
marriage was a kind of incest, providing that a “marriage [that] is prohibited 
by law by reason of race or blood” is “declared to be incestuous and 
void.”189  Similarly, a 1911 Nebraska statute defined as “illegitimate” chil-
dren produced through either incestuous or interracial marriage:  “Upon the 
dissolution by decree or sentence of nullity of any marriage that is prohib-
ited on account of consanguinity between the parties, or of any marriage be-
tween a white person and a negro, the issue of the marriage shall be deemed 
to be illegitimate.”190  The frequency with which criminal and civil prohibi-
 
187  HENRY HUGHES, TREATISE ON SOCIOLOGY:  THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL (1852), reprinted in 
THE IDEOLOGY OF SLAVERY:  PROSLAVERY THOUGHT IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH, 1830–1860, at 259–
60 (Drew Gilpin Faust ed., 1981).  
188  While the incest-miscegenation parallels surfaced during particular historical periods in the 
United States, anthropologists have noted the juxtaposition of these two mutually constitutive sexual ta-
boos in other contexts as well.  See, for example, Lévi-Strauss, who notes in The Elementary Structures 
of Kinship that  
incest proper, and its metaphorical form as the violation of a minor (by someone ‘old enough to be 
her father,’ as the expression goes), even combines in some countries with its direct opposite, in-
ter-racial sexual relations, an extreme form of exogamy, as the two most powerful inducements to 
horror and collective vengeance.  
LÉVI-STRAUSS, supra note 162, at 10 (emphasis added). 
189  Courts later in the twentieth century noted this paradox and resolved it by finding that an inces-
tuous marriage could not possibly be a miscegenetic one.   
190  NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-328 (1929), repealed by 1972 Neb. Laws 820.  But see NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 28-702 (2004) (declaring any incestuous marriage “absolutely void”).  
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tions against miscegenation and incest appeared in either the same code sec-
tion or consecutive sections, suggests the extent to which the two crimes of 
blood reflected and reinforced each other.191 
Likely influenced by the frequent juxtaposition of incest and miscege-
nation in state statutes, courts during this period also conceptualized incest 
and miscegenation as analogous crimes.  For instance, in considering the 
validity of an interracial marriage contracted outside Oklahoma, where such 
marriages were prohibited, the Oklahoma Supreme Court proclaimed in 
1924 that  
[i]n the case at bar the marriage was impossible under the statute, going out of 
the state to escape the statute, and going through the form of marriage in a 
state where the inhibition did not exist, and soon thereafter returning to this 
state, and all in an effort to accomplish indirectly what cannot be done directly, 
would be a fraud upon the laws of this state by a citizen of this state, and such 
a marriage cannot be recognized by the courts, neither can it be ratified or in 
any manner become legal by time or change or age or conduct of the parties.  
The inhibition, like the incestuous marriage, is in the blood, and the reason for 
it is stronger still.192  
The Oklahoma court’s understanding of the instinctive character of the 
taboos against miscegenation and incest—the legal prohibition against 
blood-mixing naturally existing in the blood—anticipates more contempo-
rary pronouncements with respect to humans’ so-called instinctual aversion 
to incest.  As noted above, in Israel v. Allen, the Colorado Supreme Court 
observed that individuals have a “natural repugnance” toward marriages be-
tween blood relatives.193  Similarly, in In re Tiffany Nicole M., the Wiscon-
sin Court of Appeals stated that “the incestuous parent by his actions has 
demonstrated that the natural, moral constraint of blood relationship has 
failed to prevent deviant conduct and thus cannot be relied upon to con-
strain similar conduct in the future.”194   
 
191  See PETER BARDAGLIO, RECONSTRUCTING THE HOUSEHOLD:  FAMILIES, SEX & THE LAW IN THE 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH (1995); see also Hrishi Karthikeyan & Gabriel J. Chin, Preserving Ra-
cial Identity   Population Patterns and the Application of Anti-Miscegenation Statutes to Asian Ameri-
cans, 1910–1950, 9 ASIAN L.J. 1, 24 n.130 (2002) (providing a list of these state statutes).  
192  Eggers v. Olson, 231 P. 483, 486 (Okla. 1924) (emphasis added).  
193  Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762, 764 (Colo. 1978). 
194  State v. Allen M. (In re Tiffany Nicole M.), 571 N.W.2d 872, 879 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1997) (quot-
ing In re L., 888 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)).  Similarly, in Scott v. State, the Georgia Su-
preme Court infamously declared that “[t]he amalgamation of the races is not only unnatural, but is 
always productive of deplorable results.  Our daily observation shows us, that the offspring of these un-
natural connections are generally sickly and effeminate, and that they are inferior in physical develop-
ment and strength, to the full-blood of either race.”  39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869).  Likening the prohibition 
against miscegenous marriage to that against incestuous marriage and marriage between idiots, the court 
continued that 
[t]he Legislature certainly had as much right to regulate the marriage relation by prohibiting it be-
tween persons of different races as they had to prohibit it between persons within the Levitical de-
grees, or between idiots.  Both are necessary and proper regulations.  And the regulation now 
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That the two taboos were cast in terms of each other is striking in light 
of the fact that, whereas incest signified the unnatural mixing of the same, 
miscegenation signified the unnatural mixing of the dissimilar.  In com-
menting on Henry Hughes’s strange conflation of blood crimes in his infa-
mous denunciation, one scholar has noted that “Hughes transforms the 
hybrid or mulatto from someone who is considered ‘impure’ because he 
combines qualities that are too different to mix successfully . . . to someone 
whose ‘impurity’ and transgressions lie in the blending of traits that are, by 
contrast, too much alike.”195  In fact, it would appear that the incest prohibi-
tion, which functions in a positive way to ensure or compel marriage out-
side the family, would itself create the conditions that make miscegenation 
possible.  More precisely, the more restrictive the intrafamilial prohibition, 
the more likely that one would go outside her family to find a marital part-
ner, sexual partner, or both.  At the same time, the potent taboo against mis-
cegenation—particularly in the rural South—made the threat of incest that 
much more real.196  In this sense, then, the taboo against miscegenation and 
the taboo against incest together ensured that sexual and marriage partners 
could be neither too similar to the self (incest) nor too different from the 
self (miscegenation).197   
While the routine juxtaposition of these seemingly noncomplementary 
taboos might be accounted for in a number of additional ways, including 
fears about miscegenation increasing the actual potential for incest,198 I will 
                                                                                                                           
under consideration is equally so. 
Id. at 324.  It should also be noted that while the majority of legal decisions invoked the incest taboo to 
shore up the miscegenation taboo, the incest-miscegenation analogy was not exclusively unidirectional; 
rather, the taboo against miscegenation was also used at times to support the taboo against incest.  See, 
e.g., Osoinach v. Watkins, 180 So. 577 (Ala. 1938). 
195  WERNER SOLLORS, NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE YET BOTH:  THEMATIC EXPLORATIONS OF 
INTERRACIAL LITERATURE 298 (1997) (quoting David Lawrence Rodgers, The Irony of Idealism   Wil-
liam Faulkner and the South’s Construction of the Mulatto, in THE DISCOURSE OF SLAVERY:  APHRA 
BEHN TO TONI MORRISON 166 (Carl Plasa & Betty J. Ring eds., 1994)).  
196  Commenting on Hughes’s incest-miscegenation comparison, Werner Sollors states that “the [an-
timiscegenation] hysteria that enveloped the discourse of slavery immediately before the Civil War” led 
to the “‘illogical and eventually ironic position’” of making incest the inescapable alternative to interra-
cial marriage.  Id.  Sollors describes how the “fantasy of purity” at the heart of antimiscegenation laws 
and rhetoric involved “both the need for the violent purging of impurity and the regression to the inces-
tuously toned realm of origins alone.”  Id. at 310.   
197  See, e.g., S J. Tambiah, Animals Are Good to Think and Good to Prohibit, 8 ETHNOLOGY 423 
(1969) (pointing out that in some Thai villages animals cannot be eaten if they are too close to humans 
or too distant from humans, and that sexual partners cannot be too much like the self (same sex, same 
nuclear family) or too distant (animals, people of other races)). 
198  The secrecy surrounding miscegenation and the frequent denial of one’s paternity (or maternity) 
to a “mulatto” child led to situations that supposedly raised the specter of incest and, particularly, sibling 
incest.  In his comprehensive review of the strategic placement of the two taboos in mid-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth century literature, Werner Sollors remarks that the “possibility of sibling incest in a 
younger generation,” as frequent a theme in early-Modern American literature as it was in eighteenth-
century British texts, often resulted “from the secrecy of miscegenation of [that generation’s] elders.”  
SOLLORS, supra note 195, at 303.  Sollors provides a number of illuminating examples from the litera-
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focus here on concerns relating to the theory of disgust as boundary viola-
tion.  First, linked to concerns over one’s genetic inheritance, the incest-
miscegenation analogy reflected an acute anxiety with respect to what was 
termed as one’s “social inheritance.”  For instance, dissenting in Perez v. 
Lippold, in which the California Supreme Court struck down a state anti-
miscegenation statute on due process grounds, Justice Schenk, while recog-
nizing the potential benefits of “unrestricted racial intercrossing,” 
nevertheless noted that “[r]ace crossings disturb social inheritance.  That is 
one of its worst features.”199  Similarly, in Berea College v. Commonwealth, 
the Kentucky Court of Appeals presaged the dangers of “social amalgama-
tion” when considering whether a law prohibiting the mixing of African 
Americans and whites in a single school violated the state and federal con-
stitutions.  The court there declared that “[t]he natural separation of the 
races is . . . an undeniable fact, and all social organizations which lead to 
their amalgamation are repugnant to the law of nature.  From social amal-
gamation it is but a step to illicit intercourse, and but another to intermar-
riage.”200  In this sense, blood or biology functioned as a metaphor for social 
relations, as “social practices” were cast as “biological essences” and vice 
versa.201  Eva Saks has provided a persuasive and comprehensive account of 
the constellation of issues surrounding the miscegenation hysteria, one that 
created and heavily relied on the metaphor of “blood” as a means of “con-
solidating social and economic boundaries.”202  Eugenic or hereditary con-
cerns thus reflected a much greater anxiety over the symbolic maintenance 
of social (marital, sexual) and economic (inheritance, property-related) 
boundaries between blacks and whites.   
Second, the biological mixing of blood found its legal counterpart in 
the numerous conflict of laws cases in which questions concerning the va-
lidity of interracial marriage, incestuous marriage, or both often arose.  The 
fear of interstate contamination was most viciously expressed in a dissent-
ing opinion in State v. Ross.203  In that case, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina considered whether to recognize a marriage between an African-
American man and a white woman that was validly contracted in South 
Carolina, but prohibited and subject to criminal penalties under North Caro-
lina’s antimiscegenation statute.  While recognizing that “a marriage be-
tween persons of different races [might be] as unnatural and as revolting as 
an incestuous one, and is declared void by the law of North Carolina,” a 
majority of the court nevertheless quashed the indictment, reasoning that “it 
                                                                                                                           
ture of the antebellum and postbellum periods in which “themes of interracial unions and of incestuous 
relationships are intertwined, ranging from projections and fantasies of the two taboos to representations 
of the transgressive acts, and from passing allusions to plot-constitutive centrality.”  Id. at 313. 
199  Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 45 (Cal. 1948) (en banc) (Schenk, J., dissenting). 
200  Berea Coll. v. Commonwealth, 94 S.W. 623, 628 (Ky. Ct. App. 1906). 
201  Eva Saks, Representing Miscegenation Law, 8 RARITAN 39, 40 (1988). 
202  Id. at 50.  
203  76 N.C. 242 (1877). 
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is desirable . . . that there should not be one law in Maine and another in 
Texas, but that the same law shall prevail at least throughout the United 
States.”204   
Dissenting in Ross, Justice Reade employed the language of border 
control to assert that “[n]o nation is bound to admit the laws and customs of 
another nation within its borders” and that “[i]f such a marriage solemnized 
here between our people is declared void, why should comity require the 
evil to be imported from another State?  Why is not the relation severed the 
instant they set foot upon our soil?”205  In addition, and more contemptuous 
still, the dissenting justice invoked a series of animal and disease metaphors 
to convey the disgust elicited by this failure of boundary maintenance:   
[The] provision in the Constitution of the United States, “The citizens of each 
state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
States,” does not mean that a citizen of South Carolina removing here may 
bring with him his South Carolina privileges and immunities; but that when he 
comes here he may have the same privileges and immunities which our citi-
zens have.  Nothing more and nothing less.  It is courteous for neighbors to 
visit and it is handsome to allow the visitor family privileges and even to give 
him the favorite seat; but if he bring his pet rattlesnake or his bear or spitz dog 
famous for hydrophobia, he must leave them outside the door.  And if he bring 
small pox the door may be shut against him.206  
Justice Reade’s vivid characterization of boundary control in the Ross 
dissent resonates with Miller’s cultural and sociological account of disgust, 
which he suggests builds moral and social community “by helping to define 
and locate the boundary separating our group from their group, purity from 
pollution, the violable from the inviolable.”207  Indeed, it is likely no coinci-
dence that metaphors signifying a failure of boundary maintenance, and the 
disgust that it elicits, appear in an opinion that takes up the question of mis-
cegenation—a paradigmatic form of blood mixing and biological contami-
nation.208  
 
204  Id.  
205  Id. (Reade, J., dissenting).  
206  Id.  
207  MILLER, supra note 156, at 194–95.  
208  It should be noted that the infective potential of incest was equally feared.  The very mention of 
incest was, in fact, so contaminating that in 1888 the New York Supreme Court refrained from even re-
citing the facts of an incest case that was before it:  “The prisoner was convicted of incest.  To linger 
over the facts, or repeat the details of the proof, would peril the calmness and cleanness which belong to 
a judicial record, and we should therefore touch the disgraceful history only at points where necessity 
compels.”  People v. Lake, 17 N.E. 146, 146 (N.Y. 1888).  These same sentiments reappeared in an Ala-
bama case more than one hundred years later—dealing not with incest, but with homosexuality.  De-
scribing the history behind the revulsion surrounding that taboo, the Supreme Court of Alabama just two 
years ago reminded its citizens that “[e]arlier courts refused even to describe the activity inherent in ho-
mosexuality, stating that ‘[the crime against nature] is characterized as abominable, detestable, unmen-
tionable, and too disgusting and well known to require other definition or further details or description.’”  
Ex parte H.H., 830 So.2d 21, 29 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring) (quoting Horn v. State, 273 So.2d 
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Third, the confusion of boundaries arising from blood mixing—be it 
incest or miscegenation—found a counterpart in the law of inheritance and 
property allocation.  As Leigh Bienen has noted, “traditional incest statutes 
[were] designed to uphold a property-based kinship system based upon 
marriage.”209  Specifically, Bienen maintains that the traditional laws 
against incest cannot be fully understood apart from the property system in 
which they arose.210  Explaining the ideological difference between tradi-
tional and modern incest statutes, she remarks that 
[c]onsidered as a set of rules maintaining a social structure based upon mar-
riage, rather than as laws regarding the sexual abuse of children, including de-
scent and distribution and the ownership of land within the family, the incest 
prohibition makes sense.  In the eighteenth century, divorce was rare or non-
existent.  People who owned property stayed in one place for their entire lives.  
Maintaining clarity in the ownership of land and family relationships was the 
primary goal.  In traditional statutes, the prohibited relationships focus upon 
close ties of affinity, marriage, or consanguinity.211   
In other words, traditional incest statutes represented a form of boundary 
maintenance with respect to the classification and ordering of proprietary 
relations.  In a world where “[w]ealth and stature in the community was 
based upon ownership of land,” any marriage that “would confuse the lines 
of inheritance and ownership of land . . . had to be prohibited.”212   
In one such case involving inheritance that went before the Supreme 
Court of the United States, Brewer’s Lessee v. Blougher,213 the plaintiff’s at-
torney envisioned a parade of horribles in which incest and miscegenation 
together figured as powerful solvents that could disrupt all lines and catego-
ries of inheritance.214  In that case, the Court considered the meaning of an 
1852 Maryland statute that provided that 
the illegitimate child or children of any female, and the issue of any such child 
or children, are declared to be capable in law to take and inherit both real and 
personal estate from their mother or from each other, or from the descendants 
of each other, as the case may be, in like manner as if born in lawful wed-
lock.215   
In other words, under the statute, even “illegitimate” children—including 
children produced through incestuous unions—could inherit property from 
their mother.   
                                                                                                                           
249, 250 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973)). 
209  Leigh Bienen, Defining Incest, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 1533 (1998). 
210  Id. at 1529. 
211  Id. at 1531. 
212  Id.  
213  39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 178 (1840).  
214  Id. at 184. 
215  Id. at 197 (internal quotations omitted).  
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Although the Court upheld the statute on the ground that “[t]he expedi-
ency and moral tendency of this new law of inheritance, is a question for 
the legislature of Maryland, and not for this Court,”216 the plaintiff’s lawyer 
attempted to convince it otherwise.  Specifically, the attorney argued that 
the act in question threatened to undermine the integrity and continuity of 
the family tree:   
From the careless manner of its enactment, the legislature has rendered itself 
liable to be misunderstood, and its true intention frustrated.  It has, indeed, if 
the letter be adhered to, made a general act to direct descents for the benefit of 
all illegitimate children of any female who is the propositus in the law, and 
who is to be the stirps whence these relations are to branch out, from fathers 
and mothers without marriage; and this too, embracing bastards issuing from 
adultery, and from incest of father and dauther [sic], and even son and mother; 
if the depravity of the human heart shall ever let loose such unbridled passions:  
and also embracing in its confusion, bastards lineal and collateral, running into 
the same incest and adultery, and bastards of colour mingled with whites, and 
all too in like manner as if born in lawful wedlock.  But in such a state of ille-
gitimacy, how could persons and families proceeding from such female, as the 
root, establish their right to inherit any estate from each other?217 
This notion of a world in chaos because of incest and miscegenation, as 
well as adultery, reveals a world lacking cognizable boundaries, categories, 
and lines of descent.  The metaphor of the family tree nicely captures the 
extent to which incest and miscegenation posed a threat to the coherence of 
domestic relations—in this case, a coherence conferred by the law of inheri-
tance.  Indeed, it is no coincidence that in Ovid’s story of father-daughter 
incest, Myrrha is redeemed in a sense through her transformation or meta-
morphosis into a tree—a symbol of the familial integrity that she not only 
compromised, but threatened to undermine through her incestuous relation-
ship with her father. 
This look at the analogy between the incest taboo and the taboo against 
interracial relations in legal and nonlegal sources helps to bring to light 
how, and why, incest has functioned as a potent symbol of boundary viola-
tion—and, by extension, of disgust.  During periods of enormous social and 
political change, particularly in the post-war South, intrafamilial and inter-
racial sexual relations and marriage—collectively referred to as “intermar-
riage”—represented not simply a biological threat, unions that ostensibly 
produced degraded offspring or “deplorable results.”  In addition, the un-
natural mixing that these relations entailed signified other, more symbolic 
or abstract forms of mixing and boundary confusion, including challenges 
to state sovereignty (and related fears of interstate contamination) as well as 
challenges to stable lines of inheritance.  The constellation of boundary is-
sues (and images of boundary violation) surrounding both miscegenation 
 
216  Id. at 198.  
217  Id.  
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and incest helps to clarify not only the extent to which incest came to sym-
bolize boundary violation, but also the extent to which incest was used to 
shore up a normative vision of the family—one that assumed that marriage 
(and sexuality) was marked by just enough (racial) similarity and just 
enough (familial) difference. 
2. Incest-Cloning Analogy.—The incest taboo has surfaced more re-
cently as a point of comparison to yet another boundary violation involving 
the family—namely, cloning.  Like incest and miscegenation, cloning is 
said to represent a threat because it upsets the laws of evolutionary biology, 
for, like incest, cloning involves a mode of reproduction that does not con-
tribute to the diversification of the overall gene pool.  While cloning might 
ensure the replication of the strongest genes, it might also entail the duplica-
tion of so-called weaker traits.218 
As with miscegenation and incest, however, the social and symbolic 
implications of cloning outweigh the biological threat it represents.  Simply 
put, cloning, like incest, would lead to a confusion of names, boundaries, 
and roles within the family.  In 1852, Henry Hughes fulminated that 
“[a]malgamation is incest,” thereby collapsing the distinction between these 
two crimes of blood.  More recently, Leon Kass, Chairman of President 
George W. Bush’s Bioethics Council, has cast the repugnance of cloning in 
analogous terms, suggesting that cloning precipitates not only name confu-
sion, but the drama of incest as well:   
[C]loning, if successful, would create serious issues of identity and individual-
ity.  The clone may experience concerns about his distinctive identity not only 
because he will be in genotype and appearance identical to another human be-
ing, but, in this case, he may also be twin to the person who is his “father” or 
“mother”—if one can still call them that.  Unaccountably, people treat as inno-
cent the homey case of intrafamilial cloning—cloning of husband or wife (or 
single mother); they forget about the unique dangers of mixing the twin rela-
tion with the parent-child relation . . . .  Virtually no parent is going to be able 
to treat a clone of himself or herself as one does a child generated by the lot-
tery of sex.  What will happen when the adolescent clone of Mommy becomes 
the spitting image of the woman Daddy once fell in love with?  In case of di-
vorce, will Mommy still love the clone of Daddy, even though she can no 
longer stand the sight of Daddy himself?219 
 
218  See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Richard A. Posner, The Demand for Human Cloning, in CLONES AND 
CLONES:  FACTS AND FANTASIES ABOUT HUMAN CLONING 236 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Cass R. Sun-
stein eds., 1998) [hereinafter CLONES AND CLONES] (“The likely reason that [cloning] did not evolve is 
that the reshuffling of the genes with every generation, which we get with sexual reproduction, provides 
protection against co-evolving parasites.”).   
219  Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001 Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Tech., and Space of the 
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 107th Cong. 48 (May 2, 2001) (statement of Leon R. 
Kass), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/0502kas.PDF; see also The Science and Ethics 
of Human Cloning Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Tech., and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 
Sci., and Transp., 108th Cong. (Jan. 29, 2003), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/ 
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It is precisely because cloning could blur the boundary separating par-
ents from children that Kass has opined that cloning belongs in the same 
category as incest:  “Can anyone really give an argument fully adequate to 
the horror which is father-daughter incest (even with consent) . . . ?  The re-
pugnance at human cloning belongs in that category.”220  Indeed, for at least 
one legal commentator, cloning represents orders of magnitude beyond in-
cest in its dangerous ability to violate boundaries:  “[I]f incest crosses the 
boundaries defined by the human way of coming into being, cloning twists 
and breaks them.”221 
The above quotation by Kass conveys the idea that this unnatural mode 
of reproduction raises the specter, and perhaps even makes possible, this 
“horror which is father-daughter incest”:  “What will happen when the ado-
lescent clone of Mommy becomes the spitting image of the woman Daddy 
once fell in love with?”  Just as the secrecy surrounding interracial sexual 
relations and the children they produced increased the potential for incest, 
so, too, does cloning make incest that much more possible.  In this sense, 
cloning is not only like incest because it precipitates identity confusion, but 
in fact leads to incest.   
The identity confusion and boundary violation that will ostensibly re-
sult from cloning is not limited to the more conventional Oedipal situations 
involving parents and children.  Rather, the destructive potential of cloning 
branches out into the larger family tree.  Kass has elsewhere presaged a 
range of uncanny222 incest scenarios, remarking, 
In the case of self-cloning, the “offspring” is, in addition, one’s twin; and so 
the dreaded result of incest—to be parent to one’s sibling—is here brought 
about deliberately, albeit without any act of coitus.  Moreover, all other rela-
tionships will be confounded.  What will father, grandfather, aunt, cousin, and 
sister mean?  Who will bear what ties and burdens? . . . It is no answer to say 
that our society, with its high incidence of [broken families and nonmarital 
childbearing], already confuses kinship and responsibility for chil-
                                                                                                                           
testimony.cfm?id=700&wit_id=1868.   
220  LEON KASS & JAMES Q. WILSON, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN CLONING 18 (1998); see also Lori 
Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone?  Constitutional Challenges to Bans on Human Cloning, 11 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 643 (1998) (pursuing incest-cloning analogy).  
221  E.V. Kontorovich, A Sexual Revolution   Hubris and Disastrous Attempts to Change Human Na-
ture Are Not New.  Cloning Is., NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Mar. 9, 1998, at http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
09mar98/kontorovich030998.html.  
222  I use this word deliberately, as the “uncanny” is a constitutive feature of disgust.  See William 
Ian Miller, Sheep, Joking, Cloning and the Uncanny, in CLONES AND CLONES, supra note 218, at 78.  
While never explicit, Kass has alluded to the uncanny nature of cloning when stating that “[e]ven in the 
absence of unusual parental expectations for the clone—say, to live the same life, only without its er-
rors—the child is likely to be ever a curiosity, ever a potential source of déjà vu.”  KASS & WILSON, su-
pra note 220, at 84 (emphasis added).  
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dren . . . unless one also wants to argue that this is, for children, a preferable 
state of affairs.223   
Similarly, in suggesting that “we may see in cloning the resurgence of 
our fascination with an archaic form of incest with the original twin, and the 
grave psychotic consequences of such a primitive fantasy (Cronenberg’s 
film Dead Ringers is a dramatic illustration of this),”224 Jean Baudrillard has 
called attention to the possible—albeit otherwise fantastical—causal rela-
tionship between cloning and sibling incest, a scenario that recalls Byblis’s 
fantasy of incest with her twin brother, Caunus, in Ovid’s Metamorphoses.  
In one sense, the cloning-incest analogy reflects the hysteria that often 
surrounds any “new” technology, a panic that is particularly acute in the 
face of alternative reproductive technologies.  For instance, similar kinds of 
arguments have been made with respect to the incestuous potential of in vi-
tro fertilization.  In 2001, a sixty-two-year-old French woman became one 
of the world’s oldest mothers after giving birth to a baby following fertility 
treatment.  While the woman carried the baby to term and was therefore the 
gestational parent, she was not the biological or genetic parent.  Rather, the 
baby was conceived by her brother’s sperm and a donor egg.  Although 
technically not a case of incest, a French prosecutor who was investigating 
the case commented that it represented an instance “not of biological incest, 
but [of] social [incest].”225 
In another sense, however, the incest-cloning analogy speaks to much 
more deep-seated fears about the reconstitution of the family in an age 
where boundaries and lines of demarcation are neither fixed nor stable.  Just 
as the incest-miscegenation analogy—one that appeared with greater fre-
quency after the Civil War—reflected an anxiety over the shifting social 
landscape of the postbellum South, so, too, does the incest-cloning analogy 
reflect an anxiety over the so-called de-naturalization of the modern family.   
I would like to conclude this section on cloning, and on the threat of 
incest that it tends to provoke in both the legal and literary imaginations, by 
turning to a work of fiction—a seemingly safe place where our “primitive 
fantasy” of cloning and incest, in the words of Baudrillard, may take root.  
Perhaps quite appropriately, Nussbaum’s anthology on cloning, Clones and 
Clones:  Facts and Fantasies About Human Cloning, closes with a short 
piece of fantasy (or fiction) by Nussbaum herself, entitled “Little C.”226  
 
223  Id. at 37–38.  Kass’s cataloguing of terms here—father, grandfather, aunt, cousin, etc.—recalls 
the proliferation of language that often appears in slippery slope rhetoric, as discussed supra Part II.  In 
addition, Kass’s parade of horribles scenario once again points to the nominal basis of familial relation-
ships—as part of the problem with cloning is what the natural familial terms (father, grandfather, etc.) 
will “mean” in a post-cloning world. 
224  JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE VITAL ILLUSION 12–13 (2000).  
225  Storm over French IVF Babies, BBC NEWS, June 21, 2001, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ 
europe/1401070.stm.  The brother-sister pair supposedly “tricked” doctors in California, where the 
woman underwent the procedure, into thinking that they were married (and, of course, nonrelated).   
226  Martha Nussbaum, Little C, in CLONES AND CLONES, supra note 218, at 338. 
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Nussbaum’s “Little C” is, in short, a story that explores the intersec-
tions among fiction, cloning, and incest through the first-person, elegiac 
voice of a narrator whose lover, presumably deceased or at the very least 
vanished—“You weren’t there any more.  I don’t know why, but I know 
you were gone, just not there anymore, and I was frozen with grief,”227—
reappears one day at her doorstep in the form of Little C, the “baby 
clone . . . with the defiant smile of baby Hercules getting ready to throttle 
the serpents.”228  Taking Little C into her arms, the narrator, now mother, 
proceeds to explore the resemblances between Little C and the original on 
which he is presumably based; indeed, the very name of this mystery waif 
begs the presence of an absent Big C, who, in turn, functions as the object 
of the narrator’s elegy:  “How I loved Little C.  I would hold him so hope-
fully in my arms, thinking that he would soon become you.  When his eyes 
turned from baby blue to a deeper gray-blue with flecks of yellow, a won-
derful joy began to seep into my heart.”229  
The narrator’s fantasy of reconnection—sexual and otherwise—with 
the lost original through the person of Little C is made explicit throughout 
the narrative.  At the beginning of the story, the narrator remarks, “I felt the 
baby lips around my nipple, and I imagined, as the milk flowed out, how 
the new sensation would please you.”230  Indeed, insofar as “Little C’s” nar-
rator captures the fantastical interplay between incest and cloning through 
the duplication of a former lover, Nussbaum’s piece nicely encapsulates—
and concludes—this anthology that deals in large part, and explicitly so, 
with the relationship between cloning and nontraditional sexuality.231   
But Nussbaum defies even these unconventional expectations with her 
piece.  Later in the story, the narrator tells us that Little C is, to her initial 
dismay, not like his original prototype in a number of significant ways.  Lit-
tle C, unlike his predecessor, likes the color green:  “One day when Little C 
was ten, he said to me, ‘Mother, green is such a beautiful color.  Why do 
you never wear green dresses?’  Astonished, I replied, ‘What a ridiculous 
question.  Because you hate green.’  But I was wrong, for Little C did not 
hate green.”232  Similarly, Little C, unlike Big C, has a penchant for cleanli-
ness:  “Papers in neat piles on the desk, books on the shelf, socks in the 
laundry[,] . . . cups and plates neatly stacked in the dishwasher.”233  The 
narrator recounts that she witnessed this “with approval and gentle encour-
 
227  Id. at 338. 
228  Id. at 338–39.   
229  Id. at 339. 
230  Id. 
231  See, e.g., Wendy Doniger, Sex and the Mythological Clone, in CLONES AND CLONES, supra note 
218, at 114; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Edward Stein, Queer Clones, in CLONES AND CLONES, supra 
note 218, at 95. 
232  Nussbaum, supra note 226, at 342. 
233  Id. 
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agement.  And the ice of grief began to grow again in [her] heart.”234  In 
other words, upon realizing that Little C is not, in fact, a simulacrum of her 
departed lover, the narrator, who felt that her “heart was a heavy cold 
block” following Big C’s departure, once again feels the “ice of grief . . . in 
[her] heart”—the grief that accompanies her realization that an absolute cor-
respondence between the clone and the original from which he seemed to 
issue is impossible.  She laments, “Could it be that the secrets of making 
love to you were so well known to me, while the secrets of producing you 
were unknown completely?”235  The incest-cloning motif is here once again 
made explicit—notwithstanding the profound sense of loss that follows 
from the narrator’s knowledge that her clone-child is not the replica of her 
departed lover.  In the story’s closing moments, during the performance of 
Don Carlo to which mother and son jointly attend, the narrator finally real-
izes that, like Elisabetta and Carlo, who are “fated to be mother and son 
rather than lovers,” she and Little C are “[d]oomed to be mother and son, 
forever.”236  
Nussbaum’s story—fantastical though it might be—challenges Kass 
and Wilson’s criticism of cloning as not only creating “serious issues of 
identity and individuality,” but also making possible any number of primal, 
incestuous scenarios:  “What will happen when the adolescent clone of 
Mommy becomes the spitting image of the woman Daddy once fell in love 
with?”  While Nussbaum’s story undeniably flirts with the possibility of in-
cest, it also suggests that the fantasy of merged identities between lover and 
child is just that—a fantasy—and that any attempt to recreate what is par-
ticular and absolutely singular about an individual is likely futile—even in a 
fictive world where human cloning is not only possible but desirable.  As 
the narrator tells Little C toward the end of the story, “each story has its 
own ending, and no person is exactly like any other.”237  If anything, Little 
C, who leaves home at the age of seventeen to attend Julliard, ends up look-
ing far more like his mother—as someone with a penchant for music (op-
era), literature, and perfection—than he does his “paternal” prototype.  In 
fact, one might say that Nussbaum’s story ultimately discloses the irony 
that lies at the heart of the Kass-Nelson critique:  cloning merely throws 
into relief the issues surrounding identity and individuality that are already 
present in many parent-child relationships.  Put another way, cloning is nei-
ther new nor sui generis, but instead simply represents an absurd exten-
sion—or representation—of the conventional families that we already 
know. 
 
234  Id.  
235  Id. at 343. 
236  Id. at 345. 
237  Id.  
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V. INCEST AS SYMBOL AND ITS LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
What, then, does this analysis of the incest taboo tell us about the kind 
of family that the taboo envisions, and, moreover, about what is at stake in 
having this particular model through which to define the family?  In addi-
tion, how does this analysis help to explain the dogged persistence of the 
incest taboo as a point of comparison on the slippery slope to any non-
normative kinship arrangement?  Finally, and from a more prescriptive 
standpoint, what investment does the law itself have in continuing to rely on 
the taboo in slippery slope arguments pertaining to the family?  Section A 
will draw from the previous analysis in order to summarize how and why 
the incest taboo has been used to construct an ideal vision of the family.  
Section B will then look more closely at the symbiotic relationship between 
the incest taboo and the law and will suggest that the law adopt alternative, 
or at least more expansive, discourses in which to talk about kinship rela-
tions.  
A. Incest, Non-Normative Kinship Relations, and Naturalist Assumptions  
What has this analysis shown us about the manner in which the incest 
taboo has been used to articulate a normative vision of the family?  First, 
and most basically, this analysis has brought into focus the particular threat 
that incest signifies (or symbolizes)—namely, a boundary violation that is 
tied to the way in which sexual desire is expressed in the family as well as 
the way in which a family reproduces itself.  As I have suggested, the incest 
taboo is a guard against the confusion of names and roles within the family, 
one that results from a failure to recognize that certain family members 
should not be sexual partners.  I have argued that it is for this reason that in-
cest has been linked to other forms of boundary violation—miscegenation, 
cloning, and same-sex relations—that similarly represent perversions of an 
ideal form of familial desire and reproduction.238  The taboo thus reinforces 
not only a particular vision of the family—heterosexual parents having 
children through “natural” sexual means—but also the reproductive impera-
tive behind having a family and what it means to be a family.  The claim 
that “incest taboos appear less serious than a generation ago because pro-
creation is no longer always a primary concern of marriage,”239 thus over-
looks the extent to which incest continues to signify any non-normative 
arrangement that poses a serious risk to our traditional understanding of the 
family.  
In her recent work on the incest taboo, Judith Butler has provided a 
theoretical context in which to examine the persistence of the taboo in con-
temporary rhetoric over nontraditional family structures.  Specifically, she 
 
238  While beyond the scope of this Article, it is telling that in some societies, adultery and incest are 
grouped under the same rubric defining that which is incestuous.  HÉRITIER, supra note 159, at 286–87.  
239  Grossberg, supra note 13, at 292.  
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has argued that same-sex relationships and incest both represent a “depar-
ture” from the symbolic norm—namely, a deviation from the prototypical 
way in which sexual identity is created, and maintained, in the family.  She 
has observed that  
the law that would secure the incest taboo as the foundation of symbolic fam-
ily structure states the universality of the incest taboo as well as its necessary 
symbolic consequences.  One of the symbolic consequences of the law so for-
mulated is precisely the derealization of lesbian and gay forms of parenting, 
single-mother households, and blended family arrangements in which there 
may be more than one mother or father, where the symbolic position is itself 
dispersed and rearticulated in new social formations.240 
In other words, incest is a way of describing what is troubling about 
those new formations.  Butler maintains that the incest taboo assumes or 
presupposes a certain kind of family structure—mother, father, and children 
whose sexual desires are allocated along well-defined axes of biological 
sex—that is simply not present in alternative family arrangements.  In her 
estimation, it is for this reason that 
the horror of incest, the moral revulsion it compels in some, is not that far 
afield from the same horror and revulsion felt toward lesbian and gay sex, and 
is not unrelated to the intense moral condemnation of voluntary single parent-
ing, or gay parenting, or parenting arrangements with more than two adults in-
volved (practices that can be used as evidence to support a claim to remove a 
child from the custody of the parent in several states in the United States).  
These various modes in which the oedipal mandate fails to produce normative 
family all risk entering into the metonymy of that moralized sexual horror that 
is associated perhaps most fundamentally with incest.241  
Similarly, David Schneider has remarked that “‘[i]ncest’ is symbolic of the 
special way in which the pattern of social relationships, as they are norma-
tively defined, can be broken.  ‘Incest’ stands for the transgression of cer-
tain major cultural values, the values of a particular pattern of relations 
among persons.”242   
It is important, then, to understand that incest is a powerful symbol of 
disgust not simply because it confuses lines of genetic inheritance that 
 
240  JUDITH BUTLER, ANTIGONE’S CLAIM:  KINSHIP BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH 70 (2000). 
241  Id. at 65 (emphasis added); see also Judith Butler, Quandaries of the Incest Taboo, in WHOSE 
FREUD?  THE PLACE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 43–44 (Peter Brooks & Alex 
Woloch eds., 2000) (“[T]here are probably forms of incest that are not necessarily traumatic or that gain 
their traumatic character by virtue of the consciousness of social shame they produce.  But what con-
cerns me most is that the term incest is overinclusive, that the departure from sexual normalcy it signi-
fies blurs too easily with other kinds of departures.  Incest is considered shameful, which is one reason it 
is so difficult to articulate, but to what extent does it become stigmatized as a sexual irregularity that is 
terrifying, repulsive, unthinkable in the ways that other departures from normative exogamic hetero-
sexuality are?”).  
242  Schneider, supra note 1, at 166.  
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should be kept separate.  Even worse, and as the above quotation from 
Schneider bears out, incest throws into confusion nominal differences 
(brother, sister) and the social relationships that those names signify.  The 
incest taboo thus represents a social practice over and above an innate bio-
logical response—or, in the words of the Israel court, a “natural repug-
nance.”  Indeed, the strength behind the historical analogy between incest 
and miscegenation derives less from the fact that these are two crimes of 
blood—for, as I have suggested, they represent opposite fears—and more 
from the fact that they signify confusion over one’s social and proprietary 
inheritance.   
Second, this analysis of incest as boundary violation shows that the in-
cest taboo has created an additional space in which to talk about sexual de-
viance.  The cloning-incest analogy provides a good example of the way in 
which comparisons between non-normative family arrangements and incest 
(on the slippery slope) provide an opportunity to talk in negative ways 
about any unconventional relationship and to reinforce the norm.  For in-
stance, Laurence Tribe has suggested that the debate over cloning has pro-
vided a platform for critics to inveigh against any non-normative 
relationship.243  He has remarked that “the arguments supporting an ironclad 
prohibition of cloning are most likely to rest on, and reinforce, the notion 
that it is unnatural and intrinsically wrong to sever the conventional links 
between heterosexual unions sanctified by tradition and the creation and 
upbringing of new life.”244  Similarly, Professors Eskridge and Stein have 
pointed out that “antigay sentiments probably contribute to anticloning sen-
timents. . . . [S]ome of the same impulses that form intense homophobic re-
actions would generate reactions to the possibility of cloning.”245  Kass’s 
cloning-incest analogy represents a good case in point, for the analogy has 
allowed Kass not only to articulate what is disturbing about cloning, but 
also to express his views on same-sex parenting and single-parenting as 
well.  Although Kass insists that his repugnance for cloning derives from a 
prerational intuition (or wisdom) to which we should give heed, he never-
theless grounds his arguments against cloning within the larger social con-
text of the family, and, more specifically, untraditional families.   
For instance, it is not repugnance at cloning per se that drives most of 
Kass’s arguments, but rather revulsion at the kinds of untraditional families 
 
243  Laurence Tribe, Second Thoughts on Cloning, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1997, at A31 (“Human clon-
ing has been condemned by some of its most articulate detractors as the ultimate embodiment of the 
sexual revolution, severing sex from the creation of babies and treating gender and sexuality as socially 
constructed.  But to ban cloning as the technological apotheosis of what some see as culturally distress-
ing trends may, in the end, lend credence to strikingly similar objections to surrogate motherhood or gay 
marriage and gay adoption.”).  
244  Id.; see also id. (“The entrenchment of that notion cannot be a welcome thing for lesbians, gay 
men and perhaps others with unconventional ways of linking erotic attachment, romantic commitment, 
genetic replication, gestational mothering and the joys and responsibilities of child rearing.”). 
245  Eskridge & Stein, supra note 231, at 108.  
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and “unnatural” modes of reproduction that cloning not only signifies, but, 
even worse, facilitates and encourages.  In his estimation, cloning repre-
sents the absurd extension of the “sexual revolution” that has undermined 
the naturally-conceived, two-parent, heterosexual family.  He states, 
Cloning turns out to be the perfect embodiment of the ruling opinions of our 
new age.  Thanks to the sexual revolution, we are able to deny in practice, and 
increasingly in thought, the inherent procreative teleology of sexuality itself.  
But, if sex has no intrinsic connection to generating babies, babies need have 
no necessary connection to sex.  Thanks to feminism and the gay rights 
movement, we are increasingly encouraged to treat the natural heterosexual 
difference and its preeminence as a matter of “cultural construction.”  But if 
male and female are not normatively complementary and generatively signifi-
cant, babies need not come from male and female complementarity.  Thanks to 
the prominence and the acceptability of divorce and out-of-wedlock births, 
stable, monogamous marriage as the ideal home for procreation is no longer 
the agreed-upon cultural norm.  For that new dispensation, the clone is the 
ideal emblem:  the ultimate “single-parent child.”246   
Similarly, James Wilson has argued that “[t]he major threat cloning 
produces is a further weakening of the two-parent family,”247 and, worse 
yet, the “possibility that a lesbian couple will use cloning to produce a 
child.”248  Wilson in fact questions whether “we wish to make it easy for a 
homosexual pair to have children?”249  Even Baudrillard has tacitly ex-
pressed disdain for the likelihood that cloning and lesbian parenting will go 
hand-in-hand:   
This matter of the clones, in fact, could call a number of things into question—
and that is the irony of the situation.  The clone, after all, could also appear as 
a grotesque parody of the original.  It is not hard to imagine a whole range of 
potential problems and new conflicts issuing from cloning that would turn 
oedipal psychology upside down.  Consider, for instance, a clone of the future 
overthrowing his father, not in order to sleep with his mother—which would 
be impossible, anyway, since she is nothing but a matrix of cells, and besides, 
the “father” could very well be a woman—but in order to secure his status as 
the Original.250 
Lesbian and single mothers figure prominently in these parade of horribles 
scenarios—explicit in Kass and Wilson, implicit in Baudrillard—and ap-
pear to bear the largest brunt of the debate surrounding cloning.  In this 
sense, antigay rhetoric and anticloning rhetoric are mutually constitutive 
and reinforcing—the former leading to, and doubling back on, the latter, 
and vice versa.  
 
246  KASS & WILSON, supra note 220, at 8–9.   
247  Id. at 72. 
248  Id. at 68. 
249  Id.  
250  BAUDRILLARD, supra note 224, at 26 (emphasis added).  
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By placing incest in the same category as cloning, and cloning in the 
same category as same-sex and single parenting, critics have thus managed 
to use the cloning debate as a platform from which to denounce any kind of 
untraditional family marked by “Oedipal confusion.”  It is in precisely this 
sense that the taboo against incest has been “mobilized to establish certain 
forms of kinship as the only intelligible and livable ones,”251 and that the 
discussion surrounding cloning has cast all nontraditional forms of desire 
and reproduction as “some version of original sin.”252  As Tribe reminds us, 
any prohibition, be it the taboo against incest or the related taboo against 
cloning, carries with it enormous residual social costs—particularly when 
that prohibition applies to a method of human creation or bears on the con-
stitution of the family.253  
Third, this analysis of incest as boundary violation has demonstrated 
the extent to which nature, or the notion of what is “natural,” continues to 
shape the ideal conception of kinship in the context of family law.  That is, 
same-sex relations and cloning are often grouped together with incest in 
slippery slope arguments because all three represent a perversion of what is 
considered to be a natural form of the family and a natural form of sexual 
reproduction.  Hadley Arkes expressed these sentiments when testifying be-
fore the House Judiciary Committee on behalf of DOMA, stating that “one 
thing can be attributed to the gay activists quite fairly and accurately:  and 
that is that they do have the most profound interest, rooted in the logic of 
their doctrine, in discrediting the notion that marriage finds its defining 
ground in ‘nature.’”254  A number of other critics of same-sex marriage, as 
well as cloning, have similarly adverted to the paradigm of nature to sup-
port their position against these alternative kinship arrangements. 
That nature has continued to remain an organizing principle of kinship 
relations in the family law context is a large part of the reason why the law 
in some states does not permit same-sex couples to adopt as well as the rea-
son the incest taboo itself does not apply in some states to step- and adop-
tive families.  While many individuals are disgusted when confronted with 
sibling incest between non-blood-related family members—recall, for in-
stance, the respondents in Haidt’s study or the public reaction to the Woody 
Allen scandal—the law (in many states) continues to rely on the paradigm 
of nature to determine whether sexual relationships between certain family 
members are a source of disgust (the Israel court’s “natural repugnance”) 
and therefore constitute a form of incest that warrants legal prohibition.  
 
251  BUTLER, supra note 240, at 70.  
252  Laurence Tribe, On Not Banning Cloning for the Wrong Reasons, in CLONES AND CLONES, su-
pra note 218, at 229.   
253  Tribe, supra notes 243, 244 & accompanying text. 
254  Defense of Marriage Act   Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House 
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The impulse that leads to comparisons between incest and same-sex rela-
tionships—because each is unnatural—is therefore part of the same impulse 
that has led to the uneven application of the incest taboo in families with an 
“artificial” basis, for it is only in those states where adoptive and step-
relatives are fully naturalized into the family that the incest taboo applies.  
In either case, the law relies on the incest taboo to define the contours of the 
natural family unit.  While it would appear that our understanding of what 
is natural has changed and shifted over time, the incest taboo has remained 
a relatively constant symbol of the “unnatural” in legal discourse.  In other 
words, even as the taboo has expanded to cover other familial arrange-
ments—such as stepfamilies and adoptive families—it continues to rely on 
natural law precepts in order to determine what merits legal recognition. 
Fourth and last, this analysis has revealed the discomfort that society 
experiences with relationships based on too much similarity or too much 
difference, as well as the degree to which notions of similarity and differ-
ence are deeply entrenched in law and culture.  Related to its symbolic im-
portance as an exemplary form of boundary violation, incest represents an 
unnatural mixing of the same and for this reason has functioned as a point 
of comparison to other so-called unnatural forms of sameness, such as 
same-sex relations and cloning.  While the incest-miscegenation analogy 
would appear to represent a variation on this theme, anthropologists have 
suggested that forms of excessive similarity (incest) and excessive differ-
ence (miscegenation) are equally forbidden and thus constitute analogous, 
companion taboos.  For instance, Héritier has found that the incest taboo 
works in an expansive way to forbid the mixing of the too identical as well 
as the mixing of the too different.  She maintains, 
If “combination of the identical” is thought to produce harmful results, it will 
be prohibited, and the juxtaposition or combination of different elements will 
be sought.  Inversely, if combination of the identical is thought to produce 
good effects, it will be sought out and the combining of different things will be 
avoided.255   
Others have similarly observed that in some cultures, animals cannot be 
eaten if they are too close to humans or too distant from humans, and that 
sexual partners cannot be too much like the self (same sex, same nuclear 
family) or too distant (animals, people of other races).256   
The fact that the incest taboo has been used to construct identities 
based on similarity and difference taps into a key feature of human thought 
and representation, namely, the notion of similarity and difference that lies 
“at the origin of our most profound mental categories.”257  Héritier’s analy-
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sis is once again instructive.  She notes that “a grammar is founded on the 
opposition between the identical and the different, on the classification of 
objects in one or the other category, and on the movements that affect these 
objects because of their attributed character in a classificatory category.”258  
It is in this sense that the incest taboo, which generates a range of social or-
ganizations and social categories, is both symbolic and constitutive of hu-
man thought itself.  Thus, we have come full circle.  If the incest taboo is 
the language or “grammar” that ensures the replication of the categories that 
society uses to structure acceptable and unacceptable forms of sameness 
and difference, then incest is symbolic of those ungrammatical human rela-
tions—intrafamilial sexuality, same-sex relations, miscegenation, cloning—
that give rise to our collective disgust.   
B. Law and the Persistence of the Incest Taboo 
Is the taboo an ineradicable part of the law?  One way to answer this 
question is to return to the theory of disgust discussed in Part IV.  There, I 
suggested that a characteristic feature of disgust is the act of drawing a 
boundary between us and them, or what Miller has called the line separating 
“purity from pollution.”  This same theory of disgust suggests that what ex-
ists inside the boundaries—the norm—critically depends on what lies out-
side the boundaries—the non-normative—to define itself.  For this reason, 
it could be that the law turns to what exists outside the boundaries—here, 
incest or the incest taboo—as the extreme case by which to define norma-
tive kinship relations.  This theory of disgust provides at least two reasons 
why a symbiotic relationship exists between law and the incest taboo and 
why law and culture need the taboo as a point of reference. 
Certain objects of disgust, like incest, can provide a convenient focal 
point for inciting public opinion around certain morally charged issues.  
Douglas explains that “when moral principles come into conflict, a pollu-
tion rule can reduce confusion by giving a simple focus for concern,” and 
that “when action that is held to be morally wrong does not provoke moral 
indignation, belief in the harmful consequences of a pollution can have the 
effect of aggravating the seriousness of the offense, and so of marshalling 
public opinion on the side of the right.”259  Applying Douglas’s analysis to 
the taboo under consideration, we might say that the incest taboo has been 
deployed in part to magnify the seriousness of certain acts, such as same-
sex sodomy, marriage, or both, that have not universally provoked moral 
indignation.  As discussed above, one of the reasons incest has been such a 
durable and effective player on the slippery slope is because almost every-
one is repulsed by it, regardless of political affiliation.  Those who are un-
                                                                                                                           
eral.  All human societies function on the basis of these implicit categories, even if they have not devel-
oped ‘scientific’ discourses.”).   
258  Id. 
259  DOUGLAS, supra note 147, at 55. 
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decided over the issue of same-sex marriage might be easily swayed by the 
invocation of incest.   
In addition, at the same time that disgust helps to maintain physical, 
social, and moral boundaries, it also relies on what lies outside those 
boundaries as a means of defining and sustaining that which lies within.  
For instance, in offering a structural explanation for the pollution taboos 
catalogued in Leviticus, Douglas states that “a rule of avoiding anomalous 
things affirms and strengthens the definitions to which they do not conform.  
So where Leviticus abhors crawling things, we should see the abomination 
as the negative side of the pattern of things approved.”260  In other words, 
objects of disgust—consensual incest, same-sex relations, cloning—reflect 
and thereby reinforce the norm from which they depart.  It is in this sense 
that the incest taboo, and anything that becomes indelibly associated with it, 
work to reify the existing social order and familial structure.  As Miller ob-
serves, “[l]ike those we hate, those who disgust us define who we are and 
whom we are connected with.  We need them too—downwind.”261   
Similarly, we might approach the incest taboo as a convenient symbol 
in structuring what Jonathan Dollimore has referred to as the system of “bi-
nary oppositions” that lies at the root of Western thought.262  Dollimore has 
argued that “similarity” between what lies within (the “inlaw”) and what 
lies without (the “outlaw”) creates an anxiety whereby “the outlaw . . . as 
inlaw, and the other as proximate [prove] more disturbing than the other as 
absolute difference.”  At the same time, he points to the fact that the most 
effective way to maintain this system of polar opposition is to figure its col-
lapse—that is, to depict the outlaw as proximate and similar to the inlaw.263  
In the same vein, Butler has suggested that the incest prohibition needs “to 
sustain and manage a specter of its non-working in order to proceed,” that 
is, that the incest prohibition is effective only when it produces “the specter 
of its transgression.”264  It would thus appear that the incest taboo is an in-
dispensable part of all slippery slope arguments presaging the collapse of 
sexual prohibitions and a world of sexual abandon, as the taboo maintains 
its power and efficacy by remaining a constant threat.   
If we accept this need to structure relationships according to a system 
of binary oppositions as well as the role that the incest taboo plays in main-
taining that system, the question remains as to whether the taboo is a per-
manent feature of the law.  As I have suggested, disgust and the taboos in 
which it finds expression are constitutive features of the law, which relies 
on metaphors of lines, grids, slopes, and other varieties of boundary main-
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tenance and boundary control.  In this sense, one might argue that positive 
or enacted law merely reflects and reenacts the rituals of taboo and disgust 
that have shaped and informed societies from time immemorial.  Adding to 
this difficulty is the increasingly more recognized assumption that moral 
judgment derives from intuitive disgust reflexes rather than from a more 
calculated process of ratiocination and moral reasoning.  When viewed in 
this light, it would seem that the eradication of disgust from human deci-
sionmaking is unlikely if not futile—for to require individuals to become 
cognizant of their prejudices and biases is no small task.  
One way to challenge the extent to which incest-revulsion has substi-
tuted for rational evaluation of the incest taboo (and anything to which in-
cest has been compared) is to recognize the taboo’s distinctly historical and 
social character.  Specifically, it is important to recognize the way in which 
the incest taboo has surfaced and resurfaced over time in particular social 
contexts as one of the many vehicles through which the state has controlled 
sexuality and the constitution of the family.  Leigh Bienen has remarked 
that “[t]he multiplicity of laws governing incestuous behavior” and the fact 
that the meaning of incest has varied “markedly” over time, reveal the ex-
tent to which the legal definition of incest often reduces to an “ideological” 
or “philosophical” question.265  At least one court—the Supreme Court of 
Georgia in Benton v. State—has recognized the cultural origin of the incest 
taboo when stating that “[b]eing primarily cultural in origin, the taboo is 
neither instinctual nor biological, and it has very little to do with actual 
blood ties.”266  By placing the taboo squarely within a cultural context, the 
Benton court was able to turn away from binary oppositions and natural law 
to find that “Georgia’s decision to include step-parents in its statutory pro-
scription against incest is neither unreasonable nor out of keeping with the 
historical purpose and meaning of the taboo.”267  When considered in this 
broader sociohistorical context, the incest taboo would become less mono-
lithic and comparisons between incest and other non-normative kinship 
structures less frequent.  Indeed, as some scholars have argued, it is no 
longer possible to think about those “core symbols” of American kinship, 
like the incest taboo, in the “abstracted framework in which they were first 
conceived or to neglect the ways in which Americans understand them as 
‘naturally’ gendered configurations.”268 
 
265  Bienen, supra note 209, at 1529. 
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In addition, it is necessary for the law to turn to other models or arche-
types of the family rather than to rely exclusively on the Oedipal mandate 
and on the model of the family that it presupposes.  Other disciplines, most 
notably anthropology, have more recently deemphasized the role that the 
incest taboo has played in structuring kinship relations across a range of 
cultures.  What is now referred to as the “new kinship studies” relies less on 
the symbolic importance of the incest taboo and more on the “diffuse” 
forms of “relatedness” that do not adhere to the essentialist or naturalist 
paradigm that the incest taboo perpetuates.269  These studies have demon-
strated the extent to which the taboo has been used to structure kinship rela-
tions according to this paradigm, and, in the process, to denigrate 
alternative kinship arrangements (e.g., same-sex parenting) and to preserve 
gender hierarchy.  Reacting to the traditional, structuralist accounts of the 
taboo, Susan McKinnon, echoing Gayle Rubin, has remarked that “[t]he in-
cest taboo . . . [has been] framed as the paternal and fraternal rights to regu-
late the market of scarce products [i.e., women] to ensure the equal 
distribution and consumption of women.”270  In other words, the incest ta-
boo, at least as it has been theoretically conceived, supports a gender hierar-
chy whereby women are “traded out” of families in order to satisfy the 
exogamic imperative of marrying outside one’s immediate clan or tribe. 
In releasing the incest taboo from its archetypal moorings, these studies 
have adopted alternative kinship models that supersede the staid conception 
of the family that currently obtains in American law.  Indeed, it is necessary 
for the law also to adopt—or simply to understand—those models of kin-
ship that do not necessarily conform to the Oedipal prototype.  In the 
United States, kinship relations continue to be determined and structured 
along blood lines.  It is perhaps for this reason that the incest taboo has con-
tinued to provide the language—or grammar—in which we articulate and 
“speak about” the family.  Insofar as the incest taboo is an integral part of 
thought and language, it is necessary for the law, dependent as it is on lan-
guage, to be one of the primary vehicles through which to challenge the 
structuralist assumptions that underlie what it means to be a family. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has offered a theory that explains why the incest taboo has 
been a persistent player on the slippery slope of sexual deviance, even 
though incest is, for the reasons detailed above, a bad fit for slippery slope 
arguments.  Although it has not suggested that incest laws should be re-
pealed, it has suggested that legal actors and policymakers look more 
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closely at the connections they make between incest and other sexual rela-
tionships—most notably, same-sex relations—and that the law reappraise 
the extent to which disgust motivates legal and political decisionmaking.   
The boundary violation theory that I have put forth serves both a de-
scriptive and a prescriptive function.  The descriptive claim that incest, as a 
mechanism of disgust, represents a prototypical or archetypal form of 
boundary violation, helps to clarify what has been for political conserva-
tives and liberals alike a strange conflation of otherwise distinct social, sex-
ual, and reproductive practices—be it incest and same-sex relations or 
incest and cloning.  For instance, groups from both ends of the political 
spectrum have commented on the unfortunate comparison between incestu-
ous and same-sex relations—some conservatives remarking that it does not 
help their cause and many liberals remarking that it hurts theirs.  And yet, 
the social science literature suggests that incest is perhaps the one taboo that 
unites both political groups, insofar as everyone is equally repulsed by it.  
Incest thus has an enormous power to disgust and thereby to unite otherwise 
divergent camps.   
The prescriptive suggestion that the law turn away from the taboo—as 
a means of structuring and organizing sexuality and kinship relations—is in 
some ways in tension with the descriptive claims that I have made here.  
That is, given the extent to which incest inspires disgust, and given the 
trenchancy of the incest taboo, how is the law to adopt alternative models of 
sexuality and kinship that do not denigrate a range of relationships in the 
process?  I suggest that while descriptive claims and prescriptive sugges-
tions often conflict in the law, this fact alone should not deter legal actors 
from turning to more empirically-based and rational accounts of sexuality 
and the family.  I would submit that at least one court, the Georgia Supreme 
Court in Benton v. State, has already made this attempt by focusing less on 
the taboo as an instinctive and universal given and more on anthropological 
accounts that have highlighted its socially-constructed character.  It would 
be wise for a range of legal actors and policymakers to follow its lead.  
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